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PRIMARY APPEAL
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiff/appellant Melany Zoumadakis appeals from (i) the jury verdict in favor of
defendant, appellant and cross-appellee Dr. Mark Mason ("Mason") on the one allegedly
defamatory statement that survived summary judgment; and (ii) the district court's grant
of summary judgment on Zoumadakis' defamation claim in favor of defendants and
appellants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. ("Uintah Basin"), Dr. Mason, Carolyn
Smith ("Smith") and Lloyd Neilsen ("Neilsen") (collectively "Appellees"), except with
respect to one alleged statement by Dr. Mason. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) and Utah R.
App. Proc. 3.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason was error. The standard

of review applied to challenges to jury verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence is
whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. When considering an
insufficiency challenge, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most
supportive of the verdict, and assumes that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence
which sustain its findings and judgment. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d
461, 467 (Utah 1996). If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict
supports the verdict, the appellate court will affirm. Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872,
875 (Utah 1995).
#248533 vl sic

1

2.

Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on

Zoumadakis' defamation claim except with respect to one alleged statement by Dr.
Mason. Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness, with no deference
accorded the district court. Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, ^8, 171 P.3d
442.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action, which is now on appeal for the second time, arose out of Zoumadakis'

employment with Uintah Basin as a home health nurse and the termination of her
employment in September 2003. Zoumadakis filed her Complaint in December 2003,
alleging claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference
with contract. District Court Record ("R.

") at 1-8. In January 2004, appellees moved

to dismiss Zoumadakis' Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. R. 31-32. On May 24,
2004, the Court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss, which order Zoumadakis
appealed. R. 97-99. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Zoumadakis' intentional infliction and interference with contract claims. Zoumadakis v.
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., et al.t 2005 UT App. 325, H17-11, 122 P.3d 891.
However, this Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the defamation claim,
holding that Zoumadakis had stated a claim for defamation. Id. at 1fl[l-5.
Following remand, the parties conducted discovery, after which appellees moved
for summary judgment on all facets of Zoumadakis' defamation claim. R. 175-77. The
district court granted summary judgment to all parties except with respect to one alleged
2
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statement by Dr. Mason. R. 440-48. On September 6 and 7, 2007, trial was held on the
one remaining element of Zoumadakis' defamation claim against Dr. Mason. On
September 7, 2007, the jury returned a verdict finding no cause of action against Dr.
Mason. R. 581-83. On December 17, 2007, the district court entered a final judgment
dismissing Zoumadakis' claim with prejudice. R. 618.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Uintah Basin is a hospital and medical system located in Roosevelt, Utah.

R. 1; 129.
2.

Zoumadakis was employed by Uintah Basin from approximately June 1990

through mid-September 2003. R. 2; 3. During periods relevant to her claim, Zoumadakis
worked for Uintah Basin's Home Health Division. R. 213.
3.

Dr. Mason is a board certified orthopedic surgeon practicing in Roosevelt,

Utah. Pursuant to a contract between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin, Dr. Mason provides
medical services at Uintah Basin's outpatient clinic and has medical and surgical
privileges in its medical facilities. R. 660 at 210-12.
4.

As part of her employment with Uintah Basin, Zoumadakis occasionally

provided home health care services to Dr. Mason's patients pursuant to medical orders
from Dr. Mason. R. 660 at 215.
5.

Appellee Smith is Dr. Mason's clinic nurse. R. 660 at 167.

6.

Appellee Neilsen is director of Uintah Basin's Home Health Division. R.

660 at 107.

3
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7.

In September 2003, Smith received a call from Zoumadakis regarding one

of Dr. Mason's patients for whom Zoumadakis was providing home health care. R. 660
at 168. The patient involved was a diabetic and presented difficult wound care issues.
Id at 170-71.
8.

Zoumadakis told Smith that she was at the patient's home, and she thought

the medical treatment prescribed by Dr. Mason was wrong. Dr. Mason was standing by
Smith's desk, and Smith therefore told Zoumadakis that she could talk to Dr. Mason
directly and handed the telephone to Dr. Mason. R. 660 at 168. However, when Dr.
Mason said hello, Zoumadakis was no longer on the line. Id. at 170-71.
9.

Because Zoumadakis was no longer on the line, Dr. Mason called his

patient. The patient was upset and told Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis had said the
treatment Dr. Mason had prescribed was wrong and inappropriate. R. 660 at 216-217.
10.

Dr. Mason's office scheduled the patient to come in a day or two later.

When the patient came in, both she and her spouse were still upset and, based on their
conversation with Zoumadakis, were concerned that Dr. Mason had not prescribed the
right treatment. Dr. Mason spent approximately an hour with the patient and her spouse
in order to calm them down and relieve their fears. Id. at 217-218.
11.

On several previous occasions, patients had reported to Dr. Mason that

Zoumadakis told them that Dr. Mason's prescribed treatment was wrong, upsetting the
patient and creating concern over their treatment. Id. at 218-219.

4
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12.

Dr. Mason was concerned about Zoumadakis' conduct with his patient for

several reasons, in* ludiitp fhril 'oumadakis' comments upset his patient potentially
interfered with the healing process and patient compliance, and negatively impacted the
trust relationship between Dr. Mason and his patient. R. 660 at 205-06; 214-18. Dr
Mason was also very concerned *n ui dial Ihis type of iru ideitl h id hapj H IH d In fun \ illi
Zoumadakis. Id. at 218-19.
13.

Given his concerns, Dr. Mason called Uintah Basin to report what had

happened and his concern over Zoumadakis' actions U 660 at 21 w I )i » lason spoke
with Vicky Holzman, assistant administrator over Quality at Uintah Basin, Neilsen, who
was head of Uintah Basin's Home Health Division, and ultimately, Carlene Jensen,
Director of Nursing. Id at 197-98; 220-21.
14.

Dr. Mason told Uintah Basin that a patient had reported that Zoumadakis

had questioned his treatment, upsetting the patient R 660 at 198 Because of his
concerns and previous similar experiences with Zoumadakis, Dr. Mason also told Uintah
Basin that in the future he did not want Zoumadakis assigned to visit his patients. Id. at
221-22.
15.

Uintah Basin's Home Health Division had enough patients that assigning

Zoumadakis to patients other than those being treated by Dr. Mason was not a problem.
R. 660 at 132-33. For example, during 2003, while Dr. Mason referred more patients to
Uintah Basin's Home Health Division than any other single physician, of the 190 Home

5
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Health patients Uintah Basin saw during that period, only 26 were referred by Dr. Mason.
Id. at 128; 133.
16.

Following Dr. Mason's initial conversations with Uintah Basin regarding

Zoumadakis, a patient also reported to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol
during a patient visit. R. 233-35; 247-48. Dr. Mason forwarded this complaint to Uintah
Basin. 7c/.;R. 661 at 142.
17.

Neilsen verbally discussed with Zoumadakis Dr. Mason's concerns over

Zoumadakis' statement to his patient regarding Dr. Mason's treatment and the patient
complaint that she smelled of alcohol. He also prepared a corrective discipline report
documenting Dr. Mason's and the patient's complaints. R. 660 at 113-14; 144-48; R. 661
at 46-60.
18.

Dr. Mason was not involved in any way in Uintah Basin's decision

regarding what discipline, if any, to impose on Zoumadakis, nor did he request that any
action be taken with respect to Zoumadakis, other than that she no longer see his patients.
R. 660 at 132-33; 144; 221-22.
19.

The written warning Zoumadakis received imposed certain conditions on

her employment, including being subject to drug testing upon request from Uintah Basin.
R. 660 at 196-97. Lloyd Neilsen met with Zoumadakis to discuss the warning.
Zoumadakis objected to the conditions, in particular, to the drug testing requirement. R.
660 at 151-52.

6
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20.

When Neilsen told Zoumadakis she must sign the written warning

acknowledging acceptance of the conditions in older to rtinain i mployed • fit stood up,
said that in that case she did not have a job, and left the meeting and Uintah Basin's
premises. Her employment with Uintah Basin therefore terminated. R. 660 at 113-14;
151-52.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Zoumadakis challenges the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason on the grounds it
is not supported by the evidence Contrary to Zoumadakis' assertions, the verdict must
be affirmed for multiple reasons. First, Zoumadakis fails to meet her burden of
marshalling all evidence in support of the verdict and explaining why such evidence is
insufficient. Moreover, the jury's verdict is in fact suppoitrd In .ttbstantial evident e
Finally, the verdict may also be affirmed on alternate grounds. The evidence submitted at
trial established only that the gist of what Dr. Mason told Uintah Basin about
Zoumadakis was that she had I ild In > patient that (he treatment I >i Mason prescribed was
wrong. Dr. Mason testified that his patient in fact reported to him that Zoumadakis had
questioned his treatment for the patient. Therefore, his statement to Uintah Basin was
tine precluding liability for defamatikui

In iddition, inv slate mint In 1 >i Mason li

Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis' care of and interaction with their mutual patients
was subject to a qualified privilege. Zoumadakis failed to produce evidence of malice at
trial sufficient to negate the qualified privilege, precluding liabilils on I >r Mason's pari

7
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Zoumadakis also challenges the grant of summary judgment in appellees' favor,
but the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees.1 Summary
judgment must be affirmed with respect to Dr. Mason's statement to Uintah Basin that a
patient complained that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a patient visit because the
undisputed evidence established the statement was true. The district court correctly
granted summary judgment with respect to Carolyn Smith's, Dr. Mason's nurse, alleged
statement to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis had questioned his treatment because
Zoumadakis failed to produce any evidence regarding what was said and because any
statements would be subject to a qualified privilege.
Summary judgment must be affirmed with respect to the disciplinary report
Neilsen prepared addressing Dr. Mason's complaint and the patient's complaint
regarding alcohol because the report was never published outside of Uintah Basin
management, and because the report was true, i.e., complaints were received. Summary
judgment should be affirmed with respect to Uintah Basin's alleged statement to the Utah
Department of Employment Security because the alleged statement was not defamatory
and because such publications are privileged. Summary judgment should be affirmed
with respect to Carlene Jensen's alleged statement regarding Zoumadakis to Chris
Dalsing because such statement was subject to a qualified privilege. Summary judgment
must be affirmed with respect to alleged statements by unidentified Uintah Basin
1

The district court's only error was not granting summary judgment on
Zoumadakis' defamation claim in its entirety, as set forth in Dr. Mason's conditional
cross-appeal at 32-34 below.
8
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employees regarding Zoumadakis because Zoumadakis failed to demonstrate any basis
on which 1 htitalt Idisni lould l»r hrM Habit ttti such st.tfetiiails

Hthtlh

.iiiiiitiaiy

judgment must be affirmed with respect to an alleged statement by Juanita Thacker, a
Home Health Supervisor, to Linda Cook, a manager in the Home Health Division,
because such statement was subject to a qualified privilege.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JURY'S VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DR. MASON SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED
At trial, Zoumadakis alleged that Dr. Mason had defamed her by telling Uintah

Basin that she was practicing medicine without a license. Zoumadakis claims that the
jury verdict in I )r Mason's favor on her claim must be reversed because il il m I
supported by sufficient evidence. To the contrary, the verdict is supported by ample
evidence and must be affirmed.
A.

The Jury Correctly Found That Dr. Mason Did Not Publish A
Statement that Zoumadakis Was Practicing Medicine Without a
License

In seeking to reverse the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason, Zoumadakis must
iirst marshal all of the evidence supporting the jury verdict and then demonstrate why
such evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108,
f 19, 57 I' hi 1 (N i This burden requires Zoumadakis to "marshal 'every scrap' of
"\

Prior to trial, Zoumadakis characterized Dr. Mason's statement both as
Zoumadakis "was practicing medicine without a license" and that she had questioned his
care with a patient. In presenting her case to the jury, however, Zoumadakis asserted that
Dr. Mason's alleged defamatory statement was that she was "practicing medicine without
a license." R.660 at 198; 661 at 184-85; see also, Opening Brief at 8.
9
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evidence that supports the jury's finding" and also that she "assume the role of'devil's
advocate.'" Id. Here, while Zoumadakis points to some evidence supporting the verdict,
she does not marshal all of the evidence, and more importantly, fails to present any
argument regarding why such evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Instead, she
simply points to evidence she believes supports her claim, in effect recreating the factual
case she presented to the jury. Because Zoumadakis has failed to embrace fully her
burden of marshaling the evidence, this Court should deny her appeal without further
analysis and affirm the verdict. See id. (If the party challenging the verdict fails to meet
its marshaling obligation, we will presume that the evidence supported the verdict);
Water Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^15, 48 P.3d 888, (where a party fails
to meet its marshaling burden, the appellate court will not disturb the verdict).
In fact, the evidence at trial is more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict in
favor of Dr. Mason. Pointing to trial exhibit 3, a document created by Vicky Holzman,
Uintah Basin's Assistant Administrator of Quality, that characterized Dr. Mason's
complaint as one that Zoumadakis is "practicing medicine without a license,"
Zoumadakis claims it is "unrefutable" that Dr. Mason uttered those words. Opening
Brief at 20. Zoumadakis did not call Holzman as a witness at trial to address the form,
and that Holzman used those words in Exhibit 3 to describe Dr. Mason's complaint does

10
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not establish that Dr. Mason made such a statement. The phrase may have been

Moreover, as Zoumadakis admits, other evidence supported the jury's finding that
Dr. Mason did not state that Zoumadakis was practicing medicine without a license. Dr
Mason testified, that his complaii it to I lii itah Basil i was that Zoi 11 i ladakis had told a
patient that Dr. Mason's prescribed treatment was incorrect or inappropriate, and that he
did not recall using the words "practicing medicine without a license" about Zoumadakis.
R. 660 at 198.4 Similarly. 1 * . Nielsen, Zoumadakis' supervisor and an ltl IOI of the
corrective discipline report, testified that he could not remember the exact words Dr.
Mason used, but the gist of the complaint was that Zoumadakis went into a patient's
home and questioned his orders as a physician, R 660 at 1

Zoumadakis suggests

that Nielsen later testified that Dr. Mason said "practicing medicine without a license,"
but again, the testimony to which she cites responded to questions in which Zoumadakis'
counsel characterized Dr. Mason's words in that manner R 660 at 110

When

In an affidavit presented to the district court at summary judgment, Holzman
testified only that Mason told her that a patient had told him that Zoumadakis questioned
Dr. Mason's treatment. R. 251.
4

Zoumadakis acknowledges Dr. Mason's testimony but then suggests that in late i
testimony, he acknowledged making the statement. Opening Brief at 21. A careful
review of Dr. Mason's testimony, however, demonstrates that he did not acknowledge
saying Zoumadakis "was practicing medicine without a license." Rather, in the first
instance, after stating that he did not believe he used those words, Dr. Mason said the
phrase was a "common colloquialism" used to describe people practicing outside the
purview of their license, but affirmed he did not recall using those specific words. Id.
198-99. In the second instance, Dr. Mason responded to a question from Zoumadakis'
counsel that characterized his statement as "practicing medicine without a license;" he
did not acknowledge having used those words. R. 660 at 205-206.
11
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asked specifically what Dr. Mason said, Neilsen stated several times he did not recall the
exact words Dr. Mason used, but that he was complaining that Zoumadakis questioned
his orders. R. 660 at 109-11L Finally, Carlene Jensen testified that she did not recall Dr.
Mason using the words "practicing medicine without a license." R. 661 at 138.
On appeal, the jury's verdict should be sustained if there is any substantial
evidence to support it. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,1^96-98, 130 P.3d 325.
Moreover, in reviewing the evidence, "[w]here evidence may be susceptible to multiple
interpretations, some tending to support the verdict, others pointing to an ill-advised
result," this Court should indulge only those reasonable inferences favorable to the
verdict. Id; see also, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991)
("When the testimony of witnesses is in conflict, we accept that testimony which supports
the jury's verdict, unless it is inherently implausible, and ignore the evidence which does
not support the verdict, even if we might think it more convincing"). Ample evidence
supported the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason and it must be sustained.
B.

The Jury Verdict Can Be Sustained on Multiple Other Grounds

In addition, a jury's verdict should be affirmed if other independent grounds exist
which support the verdict. Water Energy, 2002 UT 32 at ^[16 n.3. ("We further note that
. . . the jury's finding in favor of [appellee] on the company's claim for intentional
interference with business relations would constitute independent grounds for affirmance.
..."); see also Hodges, 811 P.2d at 164-165 (verdict may be sustained where it was
appropriate on at least one cause of action submitted to the jury). Here, the verdict may

12
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also be sustained because (i) the statement made by Dr. Mason was true, and (ii) any
statements between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin are subject to a qualified privilege.
As outlined above, the evidence demonstrated that Dr. Mason told Uintah Basin
that a patient reported that Zoumadakis questioned the treatment Dr. Mason had
prescribed. At trial, Dr. Mason testified that his patient in fact reported to him both on
the phone and in person that Zoumadakis told the patient the treatment Dr. Mason
prescribed was wrong or not correct. R. 660 at 198; 216-218. While Zoumadakis
testified she did not question Dr. Mason's treatment, that testimony does not directly
refute that Dr. Mason received such a report from the patient. Dr. Mason's testimony
regarding his patient's statement is more than adequate to support a finding that Dr.
Mason's statement was true, and the jury verdict may be sustained on that ground.
In addition, the jury's verdict must also be affirmed because Dr. Mason's alleged
statement was subject to a qualified privilege. The trial court found that statements
between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin regarding their common patients were protected by
a qualified privilege and instructed the jury regarding the same. R. 575.5 Under Utah
law, the malice required to overcome a qualified privilege requires evidence of ill will,

5

Although Zoumadakis did not dispute the qualified privilege at summary
judgment, R. 272, she now suggests that the trial court erred in finding a qualified
privilege. Opening Brief at 25. However, Zoumadakis failed to preserve an objection to
the district court's instruction and she therefore cannot challenge that instruction on
appeal. Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129 1J8, 63 P.3d 686, ("The rules
of civil procedure require a party to preserve an objection to a jury instruction for appeal
absent special circumstances; unless a 'party objects to an instruction or the failure to
give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a
manifest injustice.'") (internal citations omitted).
13
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excessive publication or that the defendant did not reasonably believe his statements.
Russell v. Thomson Newpapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992). Contrary to her
arguments, Zoumadakis failed to adduce evidence of malice.
Zoumadakis asserts that Dr. Mason's request that Zoumadakis no longer see his
patients and statement that he would refer his patients elsewhere for home health if she
continued to see his patients is evidence of ill will, constituting malice. However, on its
face this statement does not evidence malice - it is a request for action and does not
directly address the motivation behind the request. Moreover, given the specific evidence
presented by Dr. Mason regarding his motivation, the request does not give rise to any
inference of ill will or malice.
Dr. Mason testified that his request did not come from personal animosity but
from legitimate reasons related to the patient's treatment. R. 660 at 205-06; 214-18. The
patient was upset and concerned by Zoumadakis' statement, and Dr. Mason testified that
it took almost an hour to calm down the patient. Dr. Mason testified that the patient had a
difficult case and he was very concerned that Zoumadakis' comments could cause the
patient not to follow her treatment. R. 660 at 205-06. Dr. Mason indicated that stress can
also interfere with healing. Id Dr. Mason testified his concerns were magnified because
he had received previous reports from patients that Zoumadakis had questioned his care,
resulting in distress and concern on the part of the patients. R. 660 at 218-19. He
testified that while he was able to speak with this particular patient and intervene, he was
concerned that other patients might hear similar comments from Zoumadakis that he did
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not know about, and those patients might stop following his orders, impeding their
progress. Id. at 205. Finally, Dr. Mason testified he asked for Zoumadakis to be
reassigned from his patients because the incidents with Zoumadakis were negatively
impacting his relationship with his patients and potentially jeopardizing patient care. Id.
at 220-21.
Dr. Mason's legitimate concerns regarding the effect of Zoumadakis' statements
to his patient were corroborated by other witnesses. R. 660 at 143 (trust between a doctor
and patient is important to the healing process); R. 661 at 130-31 (a good trust
relationship between doctor and patient is necessary to the healing process). Zoumadakis
provided absolutely no evidence - other than the fact of the request — to counter Dr.
Mason's evidence of the legitimate and non-malicious motivation behind his request.
Given this direct and specific evidence, no inference of malice can arise from the request
itself.
Zoumadakis argues that despite Dr. Mason's direct testimony regarding the
legitimate basis for his request, it was clearly a malicious attempt to get rid of her and put
her out of a job because Dr. Mason was the largest referral source for Uintah Basin's
Home Health Division. Zoumadakis' argument is misleading. While Dr. Mason was the
single largest referral source for Uintah Basin's Home Health Division, the evidence
demonstrated that the actual percentage of Uintah Basin's Home Health patients referred
by Dr. Mason was quite small - 26 out of 190 during 2003. R. 660 at 128; 133.
Zoumadakis provided no evidence that Dr. Mason knew or believed that by requesting
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that Zoumadakis not be assigned to his patients, he would cause her employment to
terminate. Thus, that Dr. Mason did not want her to see his patients does not establish
that his request was intended to, or would, lead to her termination. In fact, as Nielsen
testified, Uintah Basin had ample other patients to keep Zoumadakis busy. R. 660 at 13233. That an inference of malice does not arise solely from Dr. Mason's request is
particularly true given that both Dr. Mason and Nielsen testified Dr. Mason did not in any
way request or suggest that Zoumadakis be terminated, or that any other action be taken
against her. R. 660 at 132-33; 144; 221-22. Dr. Mason was not involved in the
disciplinary process, and he testified that he was not aware Zoumadakis's employment
with Uintah Basin had terminated until he was served with this lawsuit. R. 660 at 222.
Finally, Zoumadakis claims malice was established through excessive publication.
However, the evidence demonstrated that Dr. Mason raised his complaints regarding Ms.
Zoumadakis only with Vicky Holzman, Lloyd Nielsen, Zoumadakis' supervisor, and
Carlene Jensen, Uintah Basin's Director of Nursing. Zoumadakis suggests that Uintah
Basin disseminated these statements into the community, and this dissemination resulted
in excessive publication. Even if it were true that Uintah Basin disseminated the
statements into the community, such dissemination by Uintah Basin provides no basis for
finding excessive publication by Dr. Mason. Moreover, as set forth below at 24-28,
Zoumadakis provided no evidence that Uintah Basin disseminated any statements by Dr.
Mason into the community.
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The evidence established that any statement made by Dr. Mason to Uintah Basin
regarding Zoumadakis was true, and protected by a qualified privilege. The jury's
verdict must therefore be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES
Zoumadakis also claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

on the bulk of her defamation claim, which related to alleged statements by Uintah Basin,
Carolyn Smith, Lloyd Nielsen, Carlene Jensen and Juanita Thacker, and Dr. Mason's
report to Uintah Basin of a patient complaint that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol. For
the reasons set forth below, the district court correctly granted summary judgment with
respect to these statements.
A.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to Dr. Mason's Alcohol Complaint Statement

Zoumadakis claimed that Dr. Mason defamed her by reporting to Uintah Basin
that he received a complaint from a patient that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol when
visiting the patient. The district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect
to this statement for multiple reasons.
1. The Statement Was True
At summary judgment, the undisputed evidence established the truth of Dr.
Mason's statement. In connection with summary judgment, Dr. Mason provided an
affidavit from the husband of his patient testifying that the patient and her husband
complained to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a patient visit. R.
233-35. Zoumadakis could not and did not dispute this evidence. Under Utah law, truth
17
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is an absolute defense to an action for defamation. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d
49, 57 (Utah 1991). On appeal, as at summary judgment, Zoumadakis argues that
summary judgment was not appropriate because the patient's complaint to Dr. Mason
was not true, i.e., Zoumadakis did not smell of alcohol. As the district court correctly
noted, however, the relevant issue was the truth of Dr. Mason's statement, not the truth of
the patient's statement. R. 443. Dr. Mason did not say the patient's complaint was
correct — he simply stated that he had received such a complaint from a patient. As the
patient's affidavit established, Dr. Mason did in fact receive a complaint from a patient
that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol. Thus, his statement to Uintah Basin was true and
summary judgment should be affirmed.
2. Dr. Mason's Statement Was Subject to A Qualified Privilege
The district court also correctly dismissed Zoumadakis' complaint with respect to
the alcohol statement because it was subject to a qualified privilege between Dr. Mason
and Uintah Basin. Zoumadakis argues that even if Dr. Mason's statement to Uintah
Basin was protected by a qualified privilege, summary judgment was inappropriate
because the qualified privilege was overcome by malice. Opening Brief at 31-32.
Zoumadakis first asserts malice existed because Dr. Mason knew the complaints were not
true. This argument rests on testimony by Chris Dalsing, former director of Uintah
Basin's physical therapy department, that the patient involved made numerous
complaints to Uintah Basin about its personnel. However, Dalsing's testimony refers to
patient complaints to Uintah Basin, not to Dr. Mason. Dalsing's testimony does not
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establish, much less support, that Dr. Mason was aware of previous complaints by this
patient regarding Uintah Basin personnel.6 Zoumadakis did not provide any evidence at
summary judgment (or at trial) indicating that the patient had previously complained to
Dr. Mason or that Dr. Mason was aware of the patient's complaints to others. Thus,
Dalsing's testimony fails to establish malice on the part of Dr. Mason.
Zoumadakis also argues that malice by Dr. Mason is established by his complaint
to Uintah Basin, and his request that Zoumadakis not be assigned to his patients. As set
forth in section 14-16 above, these actions fail to give rise to any inference of malice.
Summary judgment was appropriate on this claim.
B,

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to Carolyn Smith's Statement

At summary judgment, Zoumadakis alleged, on information and belief, that
Carolyn Smith, Dr. Mason's assistant, misrepresented to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis was
questioning his care. The district court correctly dismissed this claim based on
Zoumadakis' testimony that she did not have actual knowledge of any conversations
between Dr. Mason and Smith, but was basing her claim solely on information and belief.
R. 442. On appeal, Zoumadakis challenges this ruling, citing to Smith's testimony at
trial. The appropriateness of the district court's summary judgment ruling should be
judged on the summary judgment record. A party cannot fail to submit controverting

6

In fact, Dalsing's testimony establishes only that he believed there had been
previous complaints, not that any other Uintah Basin employee was aware of complaints.
For example, Lloyd Neilsen testified he was not aware of any previous complaints. R.
660 at 163.
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evidence at summary judgment, and then challenge the grant of summary judgment based
on trial evidence introduced in connection with a surviving claim. See Kirschner v.
Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988) (affidavits or other evidence
not before the district court will not be considered on appeal in reviewing the district
court's opinion). Zoumadakis had every opportunity to depose witnesses and develop the
record for use at summary judgment. Zoumadakis cannot complain about the result when
she chose to rely on her own unsupported assertions. To the extent Zoumadakis cites to
the trial record rather than to the summary judgment record, her appeal must be rejected.
In addition, even if such evidence is considered, the district court's dismissal of
this claim must still be affirmed, because Smith's statement is subject to a qualified
privilege and thus is not actionable. R. 442; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58 (statements made to
advance a legitimate common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the
publication are subject to a qualified privilege). Zoumadakis acknowledges that such a
privilege exists, but claims it is overcome by malice. However, at summary judgment,
and again here, Zoumadakis acknowledges that she has no actual evidence of malice on
the part of Smith, but instead speculates about possible malicious intent on the part of
Smith. Opening Brief at 34 ("It is unknown why Smith would tell Dr. Mason that Ms.
Zoumadakis was questioning his care. It is possible that. ..."); R. 274 ("It may very well
be that Defendant Smith told this to Mason to gain his objective to get rid of Melany.")
Speculation is insufficient to oppose summary judgment, and the district court's grant of
summary judgment on this portion of Zoumadakis' defamation claim must be affirmed.
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C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to the Corrective Disciplinary Action Report Prepared By
Neilsen

At summary judgment, Zoumadakis claimed that the report prepared by Neilson
was defamatory. The district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to
this claim. As the district court noted, the undisputed evidence at summary judgment
established that this report was not published to any third parties external to Uintah Basin
management. R. 444. Neither below, nor on appeal, does Zoumadakis point to any
evidence in the summary judgment record demonstrating that the report was published to
third parties. Without publication, Zoumadakis' claim fails. DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT
111, f23, 992 P.2d 979 ("the requirement of'publication' means that the defamatory
statement be communicated to a third person and that the third person read and
understand the statement").
In connection with this argument, Zoumadakis once again inappropriately refers to
trial evidence to support her claim that summary judgment should not have been granted.
As set forth above, such evidence should not be considered, but even if it is, summary
judgment must still be affirmed. For example, Zoumadakis argues that although Carlene
Jensen testified that information in Uintah Basin's personnel files are not given to third
parties, such testimony is not believable, particularly because Jensen testified that if she
knew someone were fired because of patient complaints, it would affect her decision

Moreover, to the extent review of the report by limited members of management
was deemed publication, the report would be subject to a qualified privilege. Brehany,
812 P.2d at 58-59.
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regarding whether to hire such person. See Opening Brief at 35 ("It was not convincing
that Ms. Jensen stated that the things in employee files are not disseminated to
prospective employers. . . . It is beyond reason that the items in an employee file would
not be subject to review by a further prospective employer.") These arguments are based
on pure speculation and have no factual basis. Zoumadakis failed to adduce any evidence
at summary judgment or at trial that the report had been published to third parties. The
o

district court's ruling should therefore be affirmed.
D.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to Uintah Basin's Statements to the Department of Workforce
Services

Zoumadakis also alleged that Uintah Basin's statements to the Utah Department of
Workforce Services that Zoumadakis quit were defamatory. The district court correctly
granted summary judgment with respect to this claim. On appeal, Zoumadakis argues
that the statement was false and was defamatory because she did not quit but was
terminated. If the statement is not defamatory, the fact that it was false does not make it
actionable. Moreover, while Zoumadakis asserts that the statement is defamatory, she
fails to explain how stating someone quit is defamatory, as Utah law defines defamation
as statements that "impeach an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or
publish his or her natural defects or expose him or her to public hatred, contempt, or

In addition, judgment on this portion of Zoumadakis' claim was appropriate
because the alleged defamatory statements contained in the report are true, i.e., Uintah
Basin in fact received complaints about Zoumadakis from Dr. Mason.
22
#248533 vl sic

ridicule." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). On its face the statement is not
defamatory and summary judgment was therefore appropriate.9
E.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to Jensen's Alleged Statement in a Quality Control Meeting

Zoumadakis claimed that she was defamed by Carlene Jensen's alleged statement
to Chris Dalsing during a Quarterly Review meeting that Zoumadakis had been
terminated due to a patient complaint about alcohol. The district court correctly granted
summary judgment with respect to this statement because it was subject to a qualified
privilege and because it was true.
In asserting error by the district court, Zoumadakis first argues the district court
erred in finding a qualified privilege applied, because contrary to the district court's
conclusions, lower level non-management employees were present at that meeting, and
some of them may have heard the statement. Opening Brief at 38-39. While
Zoumadakis contends that lower level employees were present, she fails to cite to any
evidence presented to the district court at summary judgment to support this assertion.
See Opening Brief at 39. Moreover, as the district court noted, Zoumadakis' evidence
established that the statements were only made to and heard by Chris Dalsing, then head
of Uintah Basin's physical therapy department and clearly a member of management. R.
445. Although Zoumadakis continues to speculate that others may have heard these
9

Also, Utah recognizes an absolute privilege to participants in judicial
proceedings. Price v. Armor, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). This privilege also
applies to quasi-judicial proceedings, including administrative proceedings. Id; see Dorn
v. Person, 512 N.W. 2d 902 (Minn. App. 1994) (employer's statement to unemployment
compensation agency regarding reasons for termination is absolutely privileged.)
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statements, neither at summary judgment nor on appeal does she point to evidence in
support of this proposition.
The district court also correctly found that the statement was substantially true, as
a patient in fact complained that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a visit, R. 233-35,
and that complaint eventually resulted in Zoumadakis leaving her employment with
Uintah Basin. Summary judgment was therefore appropriately granted on this claim.
F.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to Alleged Statements By Unidentified Uintah Basin Personnel
to Community Members

In response to appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, Zoumadakis provided
the Court with letters from certain community members who reported hearing from
various unspecified sources that Zoumadakis was fired and the alleged reason for her
termination. R. 283-93. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this
claim for several reasons. First, at least one of the letters rested on hearsay, which is
inadmissible and therefore could not provide a basis for denying summary judgment;
second, to the extent the statements arose from conversations among community
members, Uintah Basin had no responsibility or ability to police community
conversations; and third, Zoumadakis failed to provide evidence demonstrating that
Uintah Basin was responsible for the statements of unidentified employees under the
doctrine of respondeat superior liability. R. 283, 285; 446.
Zoumadakis argues that the district court erred by failing to give her the
opportunity to prove that the rumors and other statements came from Uintah Basin
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employees. However, this argument ignores Zoumadakis' burden at summary judgment.
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56, when summary judgment is sought and properly supported,
Zoumadakis may not rest on mere allegations but must come forward with specific facts,
by affidavit or otherwise, to demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists. Thornock v.
Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). While Zoumadakis provided affidavits in support
of this piece of her claim, as the district court found, Zoumadakis5 affidavits failed to
provide specific, admissible evidence that, if believed, was sufficient to establish Uintah
Basin's responsibility for the alleged statements.
First, several of the affidavits did not identify or connect the alleged speakers to
Uintah Basin. R. 287, 293. Uintah Basin cannot be held responsible for statements of
third parties not connected to Uintah Basin. Moreover, to the extent Zoumadakis'
affidavits stated that the alleged statements came from Uintah Basin employees, the
affidavits did not identify the employees. R. 283, 285. Uintah Basin could potentially be
vicariously liable for allegedly defamatory statements of its employees, if at all, pursuant
to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057
(Utah 1989). To avoid summary judgment, Zoumadakis had to provide evidence that at
trial would be sufficient to establish that the statements were made in the scope of the
speaker's employment. Id. That analysis requires proof of three factors: 1) the unnamed
employee's alleged defamatory conduct is of the general kind he/she was employed to
perform; 2) his/her's alleged defamatory conduct occurred within the hours of the
employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment; and 3) his/her
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alleged conduct v/as motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's
interest. Id.
As a matter of law, because neither of the affidavits provided by Zoumadakis
specifically identified the speaker, Zoumadakis did not provide evidence from which a
jury could determine the speaker was acting within the scope of his /her employment.
Zoumadakis did not provide evidence to establish the first element, that the unnamed
employees' duties including commenting on the reasons for Zoumadakis' termination.
To the contrary, Uintah Basin provided undisputed evidence that the duties of its
employees did not include discussing the termination of co-employees with third parties,
thereby precluding a finding that the alleged speaker was acting within the scope of
his/her employment. R. 424-25.
Nor did Zoumadakis provide evidence of the third factor, that the unnamed
employees were motivated by serving Uintah Basin's interests. Zoumadakis provided no
evidence that the unnamed employees were acting to serve Uintah Basin's interests, and
on its face, the alleged statement at best appears to be idle gossip. Many courts have
refused to attribute an employee's defamatory statements to the employer in the absence
of evidence that the employee was acting in the company's interest. Martineau v. Arco
Chem. Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20956, at *38-39 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 1998)10
(employer could not be held liable where the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate how a

Copies of unpublished cases are attached hereto, including: Martineau v. Arco
Chem. Co., Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., and Corradi v. Emmco Corp.
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supervisory employee's statements that another employee was a liar and was sleeping
with a co-employee were advancing the interests of the employer) affd, 203 F.3d 904 (5th
Cir. 2000); see also Allstate Insur. Co. v. Quick, 254 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715-16 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (employee's publication of defamatory statements outside the company's formal
grievance procedure is outside the scope of employment and employer not liable).
As numerous courts have found, an employer is not responsible for the
unauthorized gossip of its employees and supervisors. See Lamson v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., No. 14692, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1010, at *8 (Ohio App. Mar. 13, 1991)
(company whose employee published within the company sexual harassment accusations
about another employee could not be held liable for defamation under principles of
respondeat superior); Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 14 F.3d 251, 255 (5th
Cir. 1993) (employer not liable for defamatory comments of employee); Corradi v.
Emmco Corp., No. 67407, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 510, at *7-8 (Ohio App. Feb. 15,
1996) (same). The affidavits provided by Zoumadakis were therefore insufficient as a
matter of law to defeat summary judgment.
Zoumadakis argues that the district court should have found Uintah Basin was or
could have been responsible for such statements without resort to principles of respondeat
superior. In fact, respondeat superior is the only vehicle by which Uintah Basin can be
liable for such statements. See S.H. by and through R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1366
(Utah 1993) (generally, an employer is not liable for the intentional torts of his
employees unless the tort is committed within the scope of employment); Hodges, 811
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P.2d at 156-157 (employer's liability for employee's intentional and negligent torts
dependent on whether the acts are committed within the scope of employment). Because
Zoumadakis failed to come forward with evidence that, if believed, was sufficient to
establish such liability on the part of Uintah Basin for its employees' alleged statements,
the district court properly granted summary judgment on this part of Zoumadakis' claim.
G.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With
Respect to Statements of Juanita Thacker

At summary judgment, Zoumadakis, for the first time, also claimed she was
defamed by the statements of Juanita Thacker, a Uintah Basin employee. The district
court appropriately dismissed Zoumadakis' defamation claim with respect to Thacker's
statements because Zoumadakis failed to raise these allegations in her complaint, and
because the alleged statements were substantially true. On appeal, Zoumadakis argues
that dismissal on the grounds this statement was not plead in her Complaint was error
because she did not know about the statement until after appellees' summary judgment
had been made, and her failure to identify the statement in the complaint did not matter,
because it was "just further evidence that UBMC had improperly disseminated
defamatory statements against Ms. Zoumadakis . . . . " Opening Brief at 40. This
argument misses the point. Defamation must be plead with particularity to allow the
defendant to adequately discover and defend against such a claim. See Williams v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). The witness on which Zoumadakis relied
in connection with Thacker's alleged statement was available to Zoumadakis, yet she
failed to identify this statement in either her complaint or at her deposition. In so doing,
28
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Zoumadakis deprived appellees of the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the
statement. The district court therefore appropriately granted summary judgment with
respect to this statement.
In addition, as the district court noted, Thacker's alleged statement - that Uintah
Basin had received a complaint regarding the smell of alcohol on Zoumadakis' breath
and that Thacker had received a previous complaint regarding Zoumadakis - was
substantially true. As set forth above, Uintah Basin learned from Dr. Mason that a patient
had complained Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a patient visit. In addition,
Thacker testified by affidavit that she had previously received a complaint about
I
Zoumadakis using alcohol. R. 428-29. At summary judgment, Zoumadakis did not
I
provide any evidence to dispute Thacker's affidavit.
Finally, summary judgment was appropriate on this claim because Thacker's
statement was subject to a qualified privilege. The statement was allegedly made to
Linda Cook, who at the time managed the Vernal durable medical equipment office
operated by Uintah Basin's Home Health Division. R. 424. Thacker was a Home Health
Supervisor. R. 428-29. Statements between the two were therefore subject to a qualified
privilege, see above at 20, and Zoumadakis failed to provide any evidence of malice on
the part of Thacker.
in.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF ZOUMADAKIS' SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED
In her docketing statement, Zoumadakis identified as an issue for appeal whether

the district court erred in denying Zoumadakis' cross-motion for summary judgment
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seeking judgment in her favor on her motion for summary judgment. Zoumadakis failed
to provide any argument in her brief and it is therefore waived. Water Energy, 2002 UT
32atU13n.2.
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CROSS-APPEAL
In the event the Court reverses the jury's verdict in Dr. Mason's favor, Dr. Mason
cross-appeals the district court's denial of summary judgment with respect to one alleged
statement by Dr. Mason and his denial of Dr. Mason's directed verdict motion. This
appeal is conditional on reversal of the jury verdict in Dr. Mason's favor.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Dr. Mason summary judgment

on Zoumadakis' defamation claim with respect to his alleged statement to Uintah Basin
that Zoumadakis questioned his treatment with a patient or that she was practicing
medicine without a license. Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness,
with no deference accorded the district court. Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT
87, 171P.3d442.
2.

|

Whether the district court erred in denying Dr. Mason's motion for a

directed verdict at the close of evidence. In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's
denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the appellate court reviews "the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds could disagree
with the ground asserted for directing a verdict." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., et. al,
2003 UT 41,112, 82P.3dl064.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee and cross-appellant Dr. Mason adopts the statement of the case and facts
set forth above at 2-7.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the event the Court reverses the jury verdict in Dr. Mason's favor, the Court
should order judgment affirmed for Dr. Mason, as the district court erred in failing to
grant summary judgment and a directed verdict to Dr. Mason with respect to his
statement to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis' interaction with his patient. As the
district court found, communications between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin regarding
their common patients were subject to a qualified privilege. Neither at summary
judgment nor at trial did Zoumadakis provide evidence sufficient to establish malice on
the part of Dr. Mason. The district court therefore erred in failing to grant summary
judgment and a directed verdict in Dr. Mason's favor.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DR. MASON
At summary judgment, the district court found, as a matter of law, that a

conditional privilege existed between Uintah Basin and Dr. Mason that protected
statements by Dr. Mason to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis and her treatment of Dr.
Mason's patients. However, the district court denied summary judgment to Dr. Mason
with respect to his statement regarding Zoumadakis' interaction with his patient, holding
that whether malice existed was a question of fact. In fact, Zoumadakis provided no
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evidence of malice and summary judgment should have been granted on her claim
against Dr. Mason in its entirety.
As noted above, to demonstrate malice sufficient to overcome a qualified privilege
requires evidence of ill will, excessive publication or that the defendant did not
reasonably believe his statements. In opposing summary judgment, Zoumadakis argued
that malice existed with respect to Dr. Mason because "Dr. Mason made UBMC a great
deal of money. Although the Plaintiff did not question Mason's statements, he wanted
her gone. The way to do so would be to maliciously spread untruths about her
questioning his care of patients, and stating that she told patients to get a second
opinion." R. 273-74. On its face, this argument contains only unsupported speculation,
rather than evidence, that Dr. Mason acted out of malice or some intent to get rid of
Zoumadakis. Unsubstantiated argument and conclusions are insufficient to defeat
summary judgment. Winter v. Nw, Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991)
(plaintiffs reliance on his own unsupported conclusions without evidentiary support is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d
747, 748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit and arguments based solely on unsubstantiated opinion
and belief is insufficient to defeat summary judgment).
Moreover, to the extent Zoumadakis was suggesting that malice was established
by Dr. Mason's request that Zoumadakis not see his patients, this statement did not create
an issue of fact with respect to malice. At summary judgment, the evidence and any
reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Beehive
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Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). As noted
above at 14-16, given Dr. Mason's legitimate concern regarding the effect of
Zoumadakis' statements on his relationship with his patient and his patient's medical
care, and the evidence from both Dr. Mason and Nielsen that Dr. Mason did not request
any other action be taken against Zoumadakis, malice cannot reasonably be inferred from
his complaint to Uintah Basin about Zoumadakis.
At summary judgment, Zoumadakis also claimed that she had evidence of malice
because Uintah Basin disseminated the information into the community through nurses
and employees. However, Zoumadakis' allegations regarding excessive dissemination
are all related to actions by Uintah Basin, not Dr. Mason. Uintah Basin's actions can not
establish malice on the part of Dr. Mason. Moreover, as the district court acknowledged,
Zoumadakis failed to provide any evidence at summary judgment from which a fact
finder could conclude Uintah Basin was responsible for disseminating any information
regarding Zoumadakis into the community. R. 446 and above at 24-28. Thus, this
argument does not support her claim of malice, and summary judgment should have been
granted in Dr. Mason's favor.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DR. MASON'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Similarly, the district court erred in failing to grant Dr. Mason's motion for a

directed verdict at the close of Zoumadakis' case. Following the close of Zoumadakis'
case, Dr. Mason moved for a directed verdict on the ground that Zoumadakis had failed
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to provide any evidence of malice sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege the
district court found protected communications between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin.
Again, the malice required to overcome a qualified privilege requires evidence of
ill will, excessive publication or that the defendant did not reasonably believe his
statements. Russell 842 P.2d at 904-05. As set forth above at 14-15, at trial, Dr. Mason
articulated a reasonable, non-malicious basis for his alleged statements to Uintah Basin the effect Zoumadakis9 statements had on his patients, his concern over the potential
negative effect of such statements on treatment and the fact that this was not the first time
Zoumadakis had questioned his treatment with patients. R. 660 at 205; 214-20.
Zoumadakis failed to introduce any direct evidence of ill will on Dr. Mason's part or any
evidence that countered Dr. Mason's legitimate concerns.
While Zoumadakis argues that ill will or malice could be inferred because Dr.
Mason told Uintah Basin he did not want Zoumadakis to see his patients any longer and
would refer patients to another home health care agency if Uintah Basin continued to
assign Zoumadakis to see his patients, this statement does not lead to an inference of
malice. As set forth above at 15-16, there is simply no such basis for the inference
Zoumadakis seeks to draw. Dr. Mason had a legitimate reason for his comments, he did
not request that any action be taken against Zoumadakis, he was not involved in the
disciplinary process and was unaware that Zoumadakis' employment had terminated until
her complaint was filed and served upon him.
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Zoumadakis failed to provide any evidence indicating that Dr. Mason's statements
were motivated by malice or ill will as opposed to his legitimate concern over his
patients. Nor did Zoumadakis provide any evidence that Dr. Mason made the statements
to anyone except Lloyd Neilsen, Vicky Holtzman or Carlene Jensen. Finally,
Zoumadakis did not supply any evidence that Dr. Mason did not believe his statement
was correct at the time he made it, and in fact, he testified that his call to Uintah Basin
was triggered by his patient's report that Zoumadakis had questioned the treatment Dr.
Mason prescribed. The trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in favor of
Dr. Mason at the close of evidence, and, to the extent the jury's verdict is reversed, the
Court should therefore order that judgment be entered for Dr. Mason on the basis that the
district court erred in denying Dr. Mason's motion for a directed verdict.
CONCLUSION
For the rezisons stated above, in the event this Court reverses the jury verdict in Dr.
Mason's favor, the district court should order that judgment be entered in favor of Dr.
Mason on the ground (i) the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to Dr. Mason
with respect to his alleged statement to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis and (ii) the
trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict in Dr. Mason's favor.
DATED this

//

day of December, 2008.

jilahfe J. Benard
Carolyn Cox
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP
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TEXAS, HOUSTON DIVISION
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20956; 76 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P46,011
December 23,1998, Decided
December 24,1998, Entered
DISPOSITION: [*t] Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Doc. # 17], and Defendant ARCO
Chemical Company's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 29]
GRANTED. Civil action DISMISSED.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant employer filed
a motion for partial summary judgment in plaintiff employee's action that alleged employment discrimination
based on national origin in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
21.001 et seq. (1996), defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant also filed a motion
for summary judgment on plaintifTs supplemental slander claim.
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff employee filed suit against defendant employer, alleging discrimination based on national origin in violation of the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001 et
seq. (1996), intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and defamation. Defendant filed a motion for partial
summary judgment and a motion for summary judgment
on a supplemental slander claim filed by plaintiff. The
court granted the motions. The court found that plaintiff
offered insufficient evidence to raise fact questions as to
the falsity of defendant's reason for his termination, concluding that defendant had relied upon its employee's
complaints about plaintiff in good faith. The court also

found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
plaintifTs emotional distress claim because the conduct
complained of was not so extreme to be regarded as beyond the bounds of decency. The court further found that
plaintiff failed to show that a co-employee's statements
were made within the scope of her employment so as to
raise a fact issue concerning defamation. Moreover, the
court found that plaintiffs supplemental slander claim
was based on non-actionable opinions.
OUTCOME: The court granted defendant employer's
motion for partial summary judgment and motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff employee's supplemental
slander claim. Plaintiff offered insufficient evidence to
raise questions of fact as to whether defendant1s proffered reason for plaintifTs termination was false because
whether or not the complaints made against plaintiff
were false, defendant relied upon the complaints in good
faith.
CORE TERMS: summary judgment, termination, supervisor, defamation, defamatory, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, prima facie case, national origin,
liar, hostile, sexual harassment, undisputed, proffered,
defamed, slander, gossip, harassment, balling, reply, direct evidence, discriminatory, genuine, subordinate, irrational, deposition, actionable, delusional, workplace,
falsely, insane
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
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Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Motions for
Summary Judgment > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Opposition >
General Overview
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards >
General Overview
[HN1] In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
court must determine whether the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The facts are to be reviewed with all inferences drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion.
However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of
the nonmovant only when there is an actual controversy-that is, when both parlies have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden at trial.

Civil Rights Law > Civil Rights Acts > Civil Rights Act
of 1964
[HN2] One of the express purposes of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
21.001 et seq. (1996), is to provide for the execution of
the policies of Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and its subsequent amendments. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
21.001(1). Therefore, courts must look to analogous federal law when resolving claims brought under Title VII.

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General
Overview
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Burdens of
Proof > Initial Burden of Persuasion
Tax Law > Federal Taxpayer Groups > S Corporations
> Conditions & Restrictions (IRC sec. 1361)
[HN3] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it
unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to that person's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, or to otherwise adversely affect the person's status as an employee, because of that person's
race. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a). Each plaintiff bears the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General
Overview
Labor &. Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate Treatment > General Overview
[HN4] In a suit alleging discriminatory discharge, the
requirements of a prima facie case are that (1) plaintiff is
a member of a protected class; (2) that plaintiff was
qualified for the position he held; (3) that plaintiff was
discharged; and (4) that, after plaintiffs discharge, his
employer replaced him with a person who is not a member of the protected class, or, in a case in which the employer discharges plaintiff and does not replace him, that,
after the discharge, others who were not members of the
protected class remained in similar positions.

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General
Overview
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Burdens of
Proof > Ultimate Burden of Persuasion
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate Treatment > General Overview
[HN5] If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is created, and the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption disappears,
and the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons are
a pretext for discrimination. Throughout the case, the
plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the
finder of fact not only that the defendant's reasons are
pretextual, but also that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Even if the defendant's
proffered reason is rejected, enough evidence must exist
in the record for the factfinder to infer that discrimination
was the true reason for the disparate treatment. However,
the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant, particularly if disbelief is accompanied by
a suspicion of mendacity, may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination.

Evidence > Inferences <fc Presumptions > General
Overview
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate Treatment > General Overview
[HN6] A plaintiff cannot succeed by proving only that
the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. Rather, a
reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and
that discrimination was the real reason.

Evidence > Relevance > Relevant Evidence
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Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate Treatment > General Overview
[HN7] In the context of an employer acting upon complaints made by another employee, the validity of the
initial complaint is not the central issue, because the ultimate falseness of the complaint proves nothing as to the
employer, only as to the complaining employee.

specific complaints made by the employee's initial Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge,
but also upon any kind of discrimination like or related
to the charge's allegations, limited only by the scope of
the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General
Overview
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > National
Origin Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Racial
Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions
[HN8] Stray remarks, standing alone, are insufficient to
show an indicium of discrimination under Tide VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The mere utterance of a
racial epithet is not indicia of discrimination under Title
VII. Absent a causal connection between the references
and the conduct complained of, epithets become stray
remarks that cannot support a discrimination verdict.

Civil Rights Law > General Overview
Governments > Legislation > Statutes of Limitations >
Time Limitations
Labor & Employment Law > U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission > Time Limitations > General
Overview
[HN11] A plaintiff must file an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge within 180 days after the
allegedly discriminatory incident in order to recover
damages arising from that incident. 42 U.S.C.S. §
2000e-5(e)(n.

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General
Overview
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate Treatment > General Overview
[HN9] The fundamental prerequisite to the mixedmotives instruction is the presentation of direct evidence
of discrimination. Direct evidence is evidence which if
believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption. When a plaintiff presents
credible direct evidence that discriminatory animus in
part motivated or was a substantial factor in the contested
employment action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the same decision would have been made regardless
of the forbidden factor.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses,
Demurrers, & Objections > Denials
Civil Rights Law > Practice & Procedure > Civil Rights
Commissions > Complaints
Labor <fc Employment Law > Discrimination > Actionable Discrimination
[HN10] A Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or,
by inference, a Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001 et seq. (1996), action may be based upon claims that could reasonably be
expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination. The filing of an administrative complaint is ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII action. A
Title VII cause of action may be based, not only upon the

Torts > Intentional Torts > Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress > Elements
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Activities <£
Conditions > Intentional Torts
[HN12] In order to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the
defendant's actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and, (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Liability for outrageous conduct should be found
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

Torts > Intentional Torts > Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress > General Overview
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Activities A
Conditions > Intentional Torts
[HN13] An employer's conduct, even if a violation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, rises to the
level of extreme and outrageous in only the most unusual
cases. Complaints that fall within the realm of an ordinary employment dispute do not suffice for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General
Overview
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers
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[HN14] An action is sustainable against a corporation for
defamation by its agenl; if such defamation is referable
to the duty owing by the agent to the corporation, and
was made while in the discharge of that duty. Neither
express authorization nor subsequent ratification is necessary to establish liability.

Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General
Overview
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers
[HN15] Unauthorized gossip of employees or supervisors cannot be imputed 1o an employer.

Governments > Legislation > Statutes of Limitations >
Time Limitations
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Defenses >
Statutes of Limitations
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Elements >
Libel
[HN16] Libel and slander claims must be brought within
a year of the accrual of those claims. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 16.002 (a) (1986). Accrual occurs on
the date of communication, not its consequences.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Defamation > General Overview
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Defenses >
Fair Comment & Opinion
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Procedure
[HN17] A statement is defamatory if the words tend to
injure a person's reputation, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury.
Whether a document or statement is reasonably capable
of a defamatory meaning is an issue of law for the court.
All assertions of opinion are protected by the U.S. Const,
amend. I and Tex. Const, art. I, § 8. Thus, an essential
element of a defamation cause of action is that the alleged defamatory statement be a statement of fact rather
than opinion. Whether a statement is an opinion or an
assertion of fact is also a question of law.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Defamation > General Overview
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General
Overview
[HN18] In distinguishing between fact and opinion, the
court should analyze the common usage of the specific
language to determine whether it has a precise, well understood core of meaning that conveys facts, or whether
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the statement is indefinite and ambiguous; assess the
statement's verifiability, that is, whether it is objectively
capable of being proven true or false; consider the entire
context of the article or column, including cautionary
language; and evaluate the kind of writing or speech as
to its presentation as commentary or "hard" news. This
inquiry should help determine, for example, whether the
statement is to be taken as precise and literal or loose and
figurative, and whether the language is employed as
metaphor or hyperbole, or to convey actual facts.

Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Defamation
PerSe
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Elements >
Slander
[HN19] Statements are slanderous per se if they are so
obviously harmful to the person harmed that no proof of
their injurious effect is necessary to make them actionable. Matters characterized as slanderous per se are
statements that affect a person injuriously in his office,
profession, or occupation. In determining whether a
statement is actionable, the statements in their entirety
must be examined. They must be construed as a whole in
light of the surrounding circumstances and judged as a
person of ordinary intelligence would perceive them. It is
only if the statements are ambiguous or of doubtful import that a jury is called upon to determine their meaning
and effect upon an ordinary person.

Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Activities &
Conditions > Intentional Torts
[HN20] Ratification may occur when the employer confirms, adopts, or fails to repudiate that acts of its employee. Moreover, when the company knows about the
employee's acts, recognizes that the employee's acts will
continue if he is retained, does nothing to prevent the
ongoing tortious acts, and chooses to retain the employee, the company ratifies the tortious acts.
COUNSEL: For RICHARD J MARTINEAU, plaintiff:
Steven E Petrou, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX.
For ARCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, defendant: Anthony P Rosenstein, Kathryn S Vaughn, Baker & Botts,
Houston, TX.
For ARCO
CHEMICAL
COMPANY,
LISA
SWEENEY, defendants: George E Bradford, Jr, Bradford Koenig Shepperd & Kerr, Houston, TX.
JUDGES: NANCY F. ATLAS, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE.
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OPINION BY: NANCY F. ATLAS
OPINION:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court in this employment discrimination case is Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 17] ("Motion"), and Defendant
ARCO Chemical Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim
[Doc. # 29] ("Supplemental Motion"). Plaintiff has responded to both motions, and the parties have filed various replies, nl Having considered the motions and briefing, matters of record, and relevant authorities, the Court
concludes that both of Defendant's motions should be
granted.

nl See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 26] (Response); Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 36] ("Response
to Supplemental Motion"); Plaintiffs Reply to
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
37] ("Sur-Reply"); Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 3 8 ] ("Supplemental Response"). Defendant ARCO filed a Reply on the
original motion, but did not file a reply on the
supplemental motion. See Defendant's Reply to
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 35] ("Reply").
[*2]
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant ARCO Chemical Company ("ARCO" or
"Defendant") makes and manufactures chemicals and
specialty products. See Affidavit of Douglas Mathera
(Exhibit A to Motion) ("Mathera Affidavit"), P 3. Plaintiff began working with ARCO's predecessor company,
Oxyraine, at the Bayport Plant in Pasadena, Texas, in
1976. See Deposition of Richard Martineau (Exhibit B to
Motion) ("Martineau Deposition"), at 19-20; Affidavit
of Jetola Anderson (Exhibit C to Motion) ("Anderson
Affidavit"), P 2. During his tenure with ARCO, Plaintiff
held various jobs, including lab technician, shift foreman, and senior chemist. See Martineau Deposition, at
21; Anderson Affidavit, P 2.
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While working as a laboratory shift supervisor in
early 1996, several other ARCO employees began to
complain about Plaintiffs behavior in the workplace.
Technicians, chemists, and other supervisors revealed
that Plaintiff routinely cursed, yelled, and slammed
doors. See Affidavit of Eric Kolodziej (Exhibit D to Motion) ("Kolodziej Affidavit"), P 4. Thereafter, Plaintiffs
Supervisor, Eric Kolodziej ("Kolodziej") counseled
Plaintiff. Kolodziej also noted in Plaintiffs performance
[*3] review that Plaintiff had become more volatile, and
that Plaintiff was creating an unpleasant and hostile work
environment for his subordinates. See id.; Deposition of
Eric Kolodziej (Exhibit E to Motion) ("Kolodziej Deposition"), at 40—41. In order to assist Plaintiff in addressing these issues, ARCO arranged and paid for Plaintiff to
attend an interpersonal skills class in Chicago. See Martineau Deposition, at 49—50; Anderson Affidavit, P 4;
Kolodziej Affidavit, P 5.
Plaintiff found the course to be valuable, and initially seemed to have addressed his interpersonal issues.
See Martineau Deposition, at 51; Kolodziej Affidavit, P
5. In April 1996, however, Lisa Sweeney ("Sweeney"),
previously a party to this lawsuit, n2 complained to Kolodziej, suggesting that the interpersonal issues had not
been resolved. Sweeney complained that Plaintiff still
had temper flare-ups and also was following her around
the ARCO plant. See Kolodziej Affidavit, P 6; Kolodziej
Deposition, at 46—47. Kolodziej warned Plaintiff that he
should monitor his behavior with subordinates. See Kolodziej Affidavit, P 8. Kolodziej encouraged Plaintiff to
seek counseling through ARCO's Employee [*4] Assistance Program, but Plaintiff declined. See id. P 8. Kolodziej informed Plaintiff that any additional inappropriate
behavior would result in mandatory counseling. See id.

n2 Plaintiff settled his claims against Sweeney
while this case was in state court. Sweeney's
elimination from the lawsuit was a predicate to
this Court's removal jurisdiction.
The record establishes that Plaintiff perceived that
Sweeney and Plaintiff had become friends outside of
work. See Affidavit of Richard Martineau (Exhibit 1 to
Response) ("Martineau Affidavit"), P 39. From May
1995 until August 1996, Sweeney asked Plaintiff for
financial assistance, and took cash and checks from
Plaintiff, promising to pay him back. See id. PP 39—45.
Sweeney also apparently began to confide in Plaintiff,
and reveal to him intimate details about her life. See id. P
47. Sweeney regarded Plaintiff as an "older friend" and
something of a father figure. See Deposition of Lisa
Sweeney (Exhibit 11 to Response) ("Sweeney DeposiPage 5
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tion"), [*5] at 56. She also called him at home and visited his house. See id. at 55—56. According to Plaintiff,
because Sweeney had not paid him back for money he
loaned her, Plaintiff informed Sweeney that she would
have to begin making monthly payments to him in September 1996.
Again in August 1996, three technicians complained
to Kolodziej about Plaintiffs volatile behavior. See id. P
9. Once again, Kolodziej counseled Plaintiff about appropriate workplace conduct. See id.
In September 1996, Sweeney complained to Defendant again about Plaintiff, this time to ARCO's Human
Resources Department ("HR"). See Sweeney Deposition,
at 87—88; Anderson Affidavit, P 5; Affidavit of Vernon
Gilliam (Exhibit H to Motion) ("Gilliam Affidavit"), P 3;
Exhibit I to Motion (Anderson's handwritten notes of
Sept. 6, 1996 meeting with Sweeney). Sweeney complained that: Plaintiff gave her a poem entitled "Characteristics That Made Me 'Love You,'" describing
Sweeney's "great passion of fulfilling physical love," her
"most gorgeous eyes," her "beauty," and Plaintiffs desire
to "be a part of [her] life"; Plaintiff attempted to call
Sweeney at home repeatedly; Plaintiff stared at her constantly [*6] at work; Plaintiff remarked to her, "the
things I have done to your body in my dreams," and that
such caused "men have to get up and wash their sheets;"
and Plaintiff made tape recordings speculating about
Sweeney's personal life. See Sweeney Deposition, at 87—
90; 198-200; Anderson Affidavit, PP 6, 8; Gilliam Affidavit, P 4; "Characteristics That Made Me 'Love You'"
(Exhibit J to Motion) ("Poem").
Plaintiff admitted giving Sweeney the poem. See
Anderson Affidavit, P 8; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11.
ARCO management considered this to be inappropriate
under any circumstances. See Anderson Affidavit, P 8;
Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11. In the context of Plaintiffs
previous interpersonal issues, ARCO management determined that it would be best to transfer Plaintiff to a
professional, non-supervisory role and prohibit all nonwork-related contact with Sweeney. See Anderson Affidavit, PP 9-10; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11. ARCO assigned Plaintiff to a non-supervisory chemist position,
working straight days instead of shift work, with no decrease in pay. See Martineau Deposition, at 118; Anderson Affidavit, P 7; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 12. ARCO
instructed Plaintiff to stop all [*7] non-work-related
contact with Sweeney. Plaintiff agreed to this instruction.
See Anderson Affidavit, P 10; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11.
Plaintiff also was required to attend counseling. See
Anderson Affidavit, P 10; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11-12.
Despite ARCO's instructions and his agreement,
Plaintiff called Sweeney at home at 11:48 p.m. one night
in September. See Martineau Deposition, at 125—27;
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Anderson Affidavit, PP 11-12. Although Plaintiff hung
up immediately, the call was recorded on Sweeney's
Caller ID. See Exhibit K (photograph of Sweeney's
"Caller ID" box); Sweeney Deposition, at 195-98. Plaintiff claims he may have called Sweeney's number inadvertently and immediately hung up. See Martineau
Deposition, at 125—28; Anderson Affidavit, P 12.
Sweeney complained of the call to ARCO's HR Department. See Anderson Affidavit, P 11; Sweeney Deposition, at 195-98. ARCO did not discipline Plaintiff in
connection with this violation, but warned him that any
further contact with Sweeney would result in disciplinary
action. See Martineau Deposition, at 129—31; Anderson
Affidavit, P 12.
Plaintiff left work on sick leave in November 1996.
See Kolodziej [*8] Affidavit, P 15. Despite his sick
leave, and despite the fact that Plaintiffs position was a
day job, Plaintiff went to the workplace twice while
Sweeney was working the night shift. Sweeney reported
to an ARCO supervisor that these visits made her uncomfortable. See id. After determining that Plaintiff has
no legitimate work-related reasons to be at the Plant,
JCotodziej told Plaintiff that his behavior appeared suspicious. Plaintiff claimed that he needed to get his wallet
and check his mail. See id.; Martineau Deposition, at
148. Kolodziej instructed Plaintiff not to come to the
ARCO plant again without a work-related reason.
Sweeney continued to experience suspicious hangup calls at her home. She asked the Mont Belvieu Police
Department and the GTE phone company for assistance
to trace the calls. See Sweeney Deposition, at 95—95,
120-21. A GTE tracing device showed that three latenight phone calls on November 8, 9, and 10 were made
to Sweeney's home from Plaintiffs telephone number.
See Exhibit M (telephone trace records); Sweeney Deposition, at 106—07, 117. Sweeney presented this evidence
to Defendant ARCO's HR Department. See Anderson
Affidavit, P 15; [*9] Gilliam Affidavit, P 5; Sweeney
Deposition, at 121, 189.
Anderson spoke with the Mont Belvieu Police, who
confirmed the authenticity of Sweeney's evidence. See
Anderson Affidavit, P 16; Gilliam Affidavit, P 5;
Sweeney Deposition, at 189-90. Anderson and Kolodziej met with Plaintiff. Plaintiff denied making the calls,
but was unable to present any credible explanation disputing Sweeney's evidence. See Anderson Affidavit, PP
17-18; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 18; ARCO Chemical
Company, Internal Correspondence, dated Dec. 3, 1996
(Exhibit V to Motion). ARCO decided to terminate
Plaintiff for violating its instructions not to contact
Sweeney. See Anderson Affidavit, P 18; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 18; Gilliam Affidavit, P 6; Internal Correspondence.
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Plaintiff filed a written appeal of his termination, but
did not claim that he was terminated because of his national origin or citizenship.
HR Manager Vern Gilliam reviewed Plaintiffs appeal and found no basis to reverse the termination decision. See Gilliam Affidavit, PP 11-12. Gilliam had informed Plaintiff in writing that unless he could produce
relevant evidence, as opposed to mere allegations,
ARCO would have to accept [*10] the police and phone
records as authentic. See id. Plaintiff did not respond. See
Martineau Deposition, at 174—75.
Plaintiff originally sued ARCO in state court, arguing that: (1) ARCO discriminated against him based on
his national origin in violation of the Texas Commission
on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 21.001 et seq. (Vemon 1996); (2) ARCO defamed him; and (3) ARCO intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. Defendant ARCO removed this
case on May 22, 1998, contending that diversity jurisdiction existed, and that Sweeney wasfraudulentlyjoined.
The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to remand. Defendant ARCO moves for summary judgment dismissing all
claims.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
[HN1] In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the Court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. Ml
U.S. 317. 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548
(1986); f»ll] Little v. Liquid Air Corp.. 37 F.3d 1069.
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Boze v. Branstetter. 912
R2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1990). The facts are to be reviewed with all inferences drawn in favor of the party
opposing the motion. See Boze, 912 F.2d at 804 (citing
Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 784 F.2d 577,
578 (5th Cir. 1986)). However, factual controversies are
resolved in favor of the nonmovant "only when there is
an actual controversy—that is, wheil both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Laughlin v.
Olszewski. 102 F.3d 190. 193 (5th Cir. 1996).
Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of
the existence of an element essential to the party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. See
Little. 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322).
III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing
all Plaintiffs claims. Defendant argues, first, that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination
based on his national origin, nor can he proffer evidence
[*12] rebutting Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination. Defendant also argues
that Plaintiffs slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims must fail because: (1) the alleged
conduct was neither defamatory nor outrageous as a matter of law; (2) most of the alleged conduct occurred outside the limitations period; (3) the alleged statements
were not referable to or in discharge of the duties the
purported speakers owed to ARCO; (4) the alleged
statements and conduct were not and could not have been
ratified by ARCO; and (5) most of the alleged statements
were privileged.
A. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff sues Defendant ARCO for discrimination,
based on his Canadian origin, under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("THCRA"). [HN2] One of
the express purposes of the Act is to "provide for the
execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act ofT964 and its subsequent amendments (42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq.)." TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. $
21.001(1) (Vernon 1996); Schroeder v. Texas Iron
Works. Inc.. 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991). Therefore, courts must look to analogous federal law when
resolving claims brought under [*13] Title VII. See
Leatherwood v. Houston Post Co., 59 F.3d 533, 536 n.5
(5th Cir. 1995).
Defendant ARCO maintains that Plaintiffs discrimination claims must fail because he cannot establish a
prima facie case, cannot rebut Defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, and cannot
raise fact issues regarding his hostile environment claim.
[HN3] Title VQ makes it unlawful for an employer
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to that person's compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, or to otherwise
adversely affect the person's status as an employee, because of that person's race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Each plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502, 507, 508, 125
L. Ed. 2d 407, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993): Meinecke v. H &
R Block of Houston. 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995).
[HN4] In a suit alleging discriminatory discharge,
the requirements of a prima facie case are: (1) that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) that Plaintiff
was qualified for the position he held; (3) [*14] that
Plaintiff was discharged; and (4) that, after Plaintiffs
discharge, his employer replaced him with a person who
is not a member of the protected class, or, in a case in
Page 7

1998 U.L

-»L LEXIS 20956, *; 76 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CC. . 46,011

which the employer discharges Plaintiff and does not
replace him, that, after the discharge, others who were
not members of the protected class remained in similar
positions. See Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston. 66
F.3d 77. 83 (5th Cir. 1995): EEOCv. Texas Instruments.
Inc., 100 F.3d 1173. 1180 (5th Cir. 1996).
[HN5] If Plaintiff establishes this prima facie case,
a presumption of discrimination is created, and the burden of production shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr.. 509 U.S. at 506-07; Meinecke. 66
F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995). If Defendant satisfies this
burden, the presumption disappears and Plaintiff must
prove that the proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination. See Meinecke, 66 F.3d at 83.
Throughout the case, the Plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the finder of fact not only that
Defendant's reasons are pretextual, but also that Defendant intentionally discriminated against [*15] the Plaintiff. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr.. 509 U.S. at 507. Even if
Defendant's proffered ieason is rejected, "enough evidence must exist in the record for the factfinder to infer
that discrimination was the true reason for the disparate
treatment." Polanco v. City of Austin. Tex.. 78 F.3d 968,
976-77 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools. 75 F.3d 989. 994 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). However, "'the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with
the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination.'" Polanco. 78 F.3d at 976
(quoting St Mary's. 113 S. Ct. at 2749).
1. Disparate Treatment
a. Prima Facie Case
Defendant argues that, among other things, Plaintiff
must establish that similarly-situated employees were
treated more favorably in order to show a prima facie
claim of discrimination. See Motion, at 9—10 (citing
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores. 891 F.2d 1177. 1180 (5th Cir.
1990); Whitinz v. Jackson State Uniy.. 616 F.2d 116,
120-21 (5th Cir. 1980)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff
cannot [*16] do so, because while he has recounted rumors indicating that certain male, American employees
may have engaged in sexual harassment, he has no proof
that these men were similarly situated to him. n3 See id.
at 10. Plaintiff responds, arguing that the "similarly situated" standard is merely an alternative method of establishing a prima facie case, and that at any rate, Plaintiff
has shown numerous examples of non-Canadians receiving more favored treatment.

n3 Defendant contends that any claim of a similarly situated American male would have to include allegations that: "(1) an American supervisor had a harassment complaint lodged against
him by a subordinate; (2) ARCO instructed the
American supervisor to avoid contacting the subordinate; (3) ARCO then received unrebutted
evidence that the American supervisor continued
to contact the subordinate; and (4) ARCO nevertheless did not discharge the American supervisor." Motion, at 10.
Case law in this area is somewhat confused. See
Nieto y.L&HPacking
[*171 Co.. 108 F.3d 62K 623
n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Prior case law has not consistently
applied Title VII's burden-shifting framework to the
question of whether a similarly-situated employee outside the plaintiffs protected class was treated more favorably. The Supreme Court has explained that this inquiry is especially relevant to a showing that the employer's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its decision, was pretext for discrimination. On the
other hand, our court has held that such a showing may
be an available avenue by which a plaintiff can establish
& prima facie case of discrimination.") (internal citations
omitted). It is undisputed, however, that at a minimum,
Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to satisfy his
prima facie case obligations under the more traditional
standard: Plaintiff has established that his national origin
is Canadian; that he was qualified for his job, that he was
discharged, and that he was replaced by an American,
Rodney Clements. See Response, at 19—20; see also
Meinecke. 66 F.3d at 83: EEOC. 100 F.3d at 1180.
Therefore, the Court will address Defendant's proffered
reasons for termination and the summary judgment [*18]
evidence on the ultimate issue of whether Plaintiffs termination was motivated by his national origin.
b. Proffered Reasons and Ultimate Issue
Defendant contends that even if Plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, he cannot show that ARCO's proffered reasons for his termination were false, and that
discrimination was the real reason for ARCO's action.
Regarding the pretext inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has
stated, " [HN6] the plaintiff cannot succeed by proving
only that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual.
Rather, a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason."
Walton y. Bisco Indus., Inc.. 119 F.3d 368. 370 (5th Cir.
1997) (emphasis added).
ARCO argues that is has established a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiffs discharge: "dePage 8
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spite repeated counseling, second chances, and warnings
not to contact Sweeney, unrebutted evidence showed that
Plaintiff had nonetheless made specifically prohibited
late-night telephone calls to [Sweeney's] home." Motion,
at 11.
Plaintiff has not offered any evidence demonstrating
fact questions concerning [*19] whether ARCO's proffered reason for his termination was false. Plaintiff
merely maintains in conclusory fashion that Sweeney
was "untruthful," and that, had ARCO verified
Sweeney's credibility, it would have discovered that the
police doubted her story. See Response, at 22—23.
These arguments do not create fact questions.
[HN7] In the context of an employer acting upon complaints made by another employee, "the validity of the
initial complaint is not the central issue, because the ultimate falseness of the complaint proves nothing as to the
employer, only as to the complaining employee."
Waggoner v. City of Garland. 987 F.2d 1160. 1165 (5th
Cir. 1993). The relevant issue is whether ARCO terminated Plaintiff because he is Canadian. See Risher v.
Aldridze. 889 F.2d 592. 598 f5th Cir. 1995). All ARCO
decisionmakers testified that they believed Sweeney
brought her complaints about Plaintiff in good faith. See
Mathera Affidavit, P 6; Anderson Affidavit, P 20; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 23; Gilliam Affidavit, P 15. "ARCO
relied on the objective evidence, confirmed by the police
and never rebutted by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff called
Sweeney in violation of ARCO's explicit instructions,"
[*20] Motion, at 14.
While Plaintiff questions Sweeney's motives, and it
appears from the record that Plaintiff and Sweeney had a
complicated, and "mutually suspicious" relationship, see
Response, at 5 n.6, such evidence does not implicate the
veracity of ARCO's reason for his termination. n4 Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence raising fact questions
as to whether ARCO's reason for his termination was
false. Accordingly, the Court now turns to the ultimate
issue: whether discrimination was the true reason for
Plaintiffs termination.

n4 Nor does Plaintiffs argument that none of
Sweeney's complaints had anything to do with
sex or sexual harassment establish fact questions
in this regard.
Defendant ARCO argues that Plaintiff cannot raise
fact issues concerning whether the real reason for Plaintiffs termination was that he is Canadian. Plaintiff argues
that he has produced evidence of numerous similarlysituated employees who were treated more favorably. He

46,011

alleges that Jerry Goucher, an American supervisor,
[*21] observed sexual harassment and did nothing to
stop it. See Affidavit of Jim Canard (Exhibit 9 to Response), P 16. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that ARCO
took only two days to investigate Sweeney's complaints
against Plaintiff, but took two months, before dismissing
without investigating, Plaintiffs complaints of harassment by Sweeney.
First, ARCO maintains that Plaintiff was not fired
following Sweeney's September 1996 complaints, regardless of whether or not they are characterized as sexual harassment complaints. Instead, Plaintiff was fired
after disregarding ARCO's explicit instructions not to
contact Sweeney at home. Thus, Plaintiffs comparisons
to other ARCO employees who allegedly engaged in
sexual harassment is misplaced. The uncontradicted evidence is that Plaintiff was terminated for insubordination
in refusing to comply with express company directives.
In any event, it is undisputed that none of the decisionmakers in this case are the supervisors involved in or
even aware of the alleged sexual harassment incidents to
which Plaintiff alludes. See Anderson Affidavit, P 21;
Kolodziej Affidavit, P^26; Kolodziej Deposition, at 103;
Mathera Deposition, at 31—34; Gilliam [*22] Deposition, at 18, 23. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to provide
evidence raising fact questions that any similarly situated, alleged American harassers, were treated better
than he was.
Moreover, the Court concurs with ARCO that, "even
if Plaintiff could prove that many years ago harassment
was treated less seriously than today, that would hardly
make it wrongful for modern management to discharge
its legal duty to investigate and effectively respond to
such conduct." Motion, at 12 (citing Waltman v. International Paver Co.. 875 F.2d 468. 479 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Finally, because of the remoteness in time of the alleged
incidents, such allegations constitute, at best, a scintilla
of evidence, and are insufficient to meet Plaintiffs summary judgment burden.
The only evidence Plaintiff offers regarding disparaging comments are alleged inquiries by Kolodziej in
1994 to see Plaintiffs green card, and about why Plaintiff
had not become a U.S. citizen. Although ARCO denies
these allegations, the Court will assume they are true for
the purposes of the pending motions. The Court finds
and concludes that the alleged remarks are not facially
discriminatory. Plaintiff himself has had discussions
[*23] withfriendsas to why he had not become a United
States citizen. Further, Plaintiffs termination occurred 2
1/2 years after these comments allegedly were made, and
are at most "stray remarks."
[HN8] Stray remarks, standing alone, are insufficient to show an indicium of discrimination Title VII. In
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Boyd v. State Farm, plaintiff presented credible evidence
that showed that supervisor referred to him as "Buckwheat." 158 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Or. 1998). The Fifth
Circuit held that the "mere utterance of a racial epithet is
not indicia of discrimination under Title VIL" Id. (citing
Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co.. Inc.* 26 F.3d
1277, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff Boyd also alleged,
through affidavit only, that a supervisor called him a
"porch monkey." The Fifth Circuit held that there was no
evidence of a causal connection between the stray remark and the defendant's failure to promote plaintiff.
"Absent a causal connection between the references and
the conduct complained of, such epithets become stray
remarks that cannot support a discrimination verdict." Id.
(citing Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 434
(5th Cir. 1995)). n5 Similarly, from the record, the [*24]
Court discerns no causal connection between Kolodziej's
alleged remarks, and Plaintiffs termination several years
later. Moreover, Kolodziej was only one of several
ARCO supervisors who made the decision to terminate
Plaintiffs employment. Accordingly, on this record
Plaintiff has not raised a genuine question of material
fact regarding the ultimate issue of discrimination based
on his Canadian nationality. n6

n5 The Court approvingly cited Brown v. CSC
Logic. Inc.. 82 F.3d 651. 656 (5th Cir. 1996),
which held that specific comments over a lengthy
period of time sufficient to establish discrimination. See Boyd, No. 97-11396, at 485 note 2.
n6 Nor can Plaintiff sustain his summary judgment burden by arguing that ARCO conducted a
biased investigation. It is undisputed that Plaintiff
was counseled several times before his ultimate
termination. This again misses the point; ARCO
terminated Plaintiff because it perceived that
Plaintiff had violated its express orders to leave
Sweeney alone. The fact that Vern Gilliam,
ARCO's Human Resources Manager, admitted he
did nothing to investigate whether Plaintiffs
"civil rights" were violated is not pertinent to
whether ARCO conducted a biased investigation
of Sweeney's complaints. It is undisputed that
ARCO verified the phone call traces from an objective, third source: the Mont Belvieu Police
Force. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot raise fact
questions by arguing that ARCO allegedly conducted a biased investigation of his own complaints.
[*25]
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This is a case in which the employer, ARCO, gave
its employee ample opportunity to cease offensive behavior and to comply with clear prophylactic directives
to leave another employee alone and observe her interest
in privacy. ARCO's perception that Plaintiff repeatedly
defied the company's orders and ignored repeated warnings was well-founded. Plaintiff, grasping at straws, has
not offered evidence of any substance that would support
a jury verdict in his favor. See Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving Inc.. 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)
("Once the moving party presents the district court with a
properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary
judgment is inappropriate."). Summary judgment is warranted dismissing Plaintiffs TCHRA claim.
c. Mixed Motive Analysis
In his response, Plaintiff makes an obscure reference
to the "mixed motive" standard in Title VII cases, and
argues that "Plaintiff need only show that national origin
was a 'motivating' factor in ARCO's decision to discharge him." Response, at 23. Defendant ARCO does not
appear to respond to this argument, but the Court will
address it in an exercise of [*26] caution.
[HN9] "The fundamental prerequisite to the mixedmotives instruction is the presentation of direct evidence
of discrimination." Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co.* 54
F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995). "Direct evidence" is
"evidence which if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption." Id.
(citing Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n% 989
F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) n7 ).

n7 The Court in Brown held:

When a plaintiff presents credible
direct evidence mat discriminatory
animus in part motivated or was a
substantial factor in the contested
employment action, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same decision
would have been made regardless
of the forbidden factor. Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.

Brown* 989 F.2dat 861.
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Plaintiff argues that he "has raised numerous fact issues which [*27] demonstrate that the key decisionmaker, Eric Kolodziej, was motivated by his resentment
of Plaintiffs national origin." Response, at 23. Plaintiff
claims Kolodziej's resentment was evidence because he
demanded to see Plaintiffs green card, asked Plaintiff
why he had not become an American, and failed to discipline an employee who complained of a "fucking foreigner." See id. The Court determines that these comments do not rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination. While "a supervisor's open and routine use
of. . . slurs" may constitute direct evidence of an impermissible motivating factor," Kolodziej's statements do
not prove the fact of discrimination without inference or
presumption. As noted above, the inquiry was years before Plaintiffs offending conduct and the remarks were
not inherently racially discriminatory or antagonistic to
foreigners, or Canadians. "The offending comments [can
be] reasonably interpreted as [something] other that a
reflection of bias . . . ." Moonev. 54 F.3d at 1217.
Because Plaintiff has failed to show fact questions
regarding direct evidence of discrimination, the burden
does not shift to ARCO to show that it would have made
[*28] the same decision in the absence of discriminatory
motive. Plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment on
his Title VII claim on a mixed-motive analysis.
2. Hostile Environment
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to
meet his burden on any hostile environment claim: Defendant argues that Plaintiffs hostile environment claim
is barred because it cannot reasonably be construed as
growing out of his charge of discrimination, that it is
barred by the statute of limitations, and also that Plaintiffs allegations do not rise to the level of hostile environment. Plaintiff counters that his hostile environment
claims were timely raised, that his charge refers to a
"continuing pattern" of discrimination, and that fact
questions exist supporting his hostile environment claim.
a. Administrative Exhaustion
[HN10] A Title VII (or, by inference, a TCHRA)
action may be based upon claims that "could reasonably
be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination." The Fifth Circuit recently held:

The filing of an administrative complaint
is ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite
to a Title VII action. Ray v. Freeman,
626 F.2d 439. 442 (5th Or. 1980). [*29]
cert denied, 450 U.S. 997. 68 L. Ed. 2d
198. 101 S. Ct. 1701 (1981). . . . A Title
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VII cause of action may be based, not
only upon the specific complaints made
by the employee's initial EEOC charge,
but also upon any kind of discrimination
like or related to the charge's allegations,
limited only by the scope of the EEOC
investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of
discrimination. Fine v. GAF Chemical
Corp.. 995 F.2d 576. 578 (5th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Fellows v. Universal Restaurants. Inc.. 701 F.2d 447. 451 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 828. 78 L. Ed. 2d
106. 104 S.Ct. 102(1983)).

Dollis v. Rubin. 11 F.3d 777. 781 (5th Cir. 1995).
ARCO argues that Plaintiff never alleged that
ARCO had subjected him to a hostile work environment
in his TCHRA charge of discrimination. Plaintiff responds that "the hostile work environment issues raised
by Plaintiff are directly related to his national origin discrimination complaint and are not barred. Plaintiff
checked the box for national origin discrimination in his
TCHRA and EEOC charge. . . . Plaintiffs charge refers
to a continuing pattern of discrimination based on unequal [*30] treatment and a pervasive environment such
as derogatory comments such as 'dumb ass Canadian.'"
Response, at 26. The scope of the claims Plaintiff intended to assert is not entirely clear from his charge.
Plaintiff did allege: "During my employment with
ARCO, I was called a 'dumb ass Canadian* and foreigner
by supervisors and fellow employees . . . ." Charge of
Discrimination (Exhibit 28 to Response). The charge
should be construed broadly. See Clark v. Kraft Foods,
Inc.. 18 F.3d 1278. 1280 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) ("liberal
construction [is] accorded EEOC charges, especially
those by unlawyered complainants'") (quoting Fellows v.
Universal Restaurants. Inc.. 701 F.2d 447. 451 (5th Cir.
1983)). Thus, construing all doubts in favor of Plaintiff,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs sparse allegations could
reasonably have led to an EEOC investigation into a hostile environment claim.
b. Statute of Limitations
[HN11] A plaintiff must file an EEOC charge
within 180 days after the allegedly discriminatory incident in order to recover damages arising from that incident. See 42U.S.C. 8 2000e-5(e)(l).
Defendant argues that "Plaintiff has not cited one
specific instance of alleged [*31] national origin harassment within the limitations period-that is, within 180
days before the filing of his TCHRA charge in 1997."
Reply, at 9. Plaintiff counters that his charge was filed
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within the time limits of the last discriminatory act,
which was the termination of Plaintiff on December 2,
1996. This evidence, however, is insufficient. Plaintiffs
termination was an act of allegedly disparate treatment,
separate and discrete from the alleged harassing conduct.
Therefore, none of the alleged national origin harassment
alleged by Plaintiff occurred within the actionable limitations period. Plaintiffs Title VII harassment claim thus is
time-barred.
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In order to recover damages for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, Plaintiff must prove the following:

(1) Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly;
(2) Defendants' conduct was extreme and
outrageous;

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant ARCO argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the alleged conduct does not rise to a
legally actionable level, because certain of the comments
by Kolodziej are time-barred, and because ARCO cannot
be held liable for Sweeney's alleged misconduct. Plaintiff
responds with a litany of statements and conduct that he
alleges rise above the level of ordinary employment disputes, n8 however, he does not address [*32] ARCO's
limitations and agency arguments.

n8 Plaintiff recites the following as evidence of
fact questions regarding intentional infliction of
emotional distress: Kolodziej falsely accused
Plaintiff of sexually harassing Sweeney; Kolodziej falsely accused Plaintiff of "balling"
Sweeney; Kolodziej falsely accused Plaintiff of
being insane, delusional and irrational; Kolodziej
prepared a letter demoting Plaintiff without first
consulting Plaintiff; Kolodziej falsely accused
Plaintiff of creating a hostile work environment;
Kolodziej laughed at Plaintiff and told him he
had no legalrights;Gilliam promised a full investigation, but allegedly performed no investigation; Kolodziej asked to see Plaintiffs green card;
Kolodziej asked why Plaintiff had not become a
citizen after 20 years; Kolodziej referred to Plaintiff as "Dad," and refused to refer to him by his
first name; Anderson told Plaintiff he had no legal rights; ARCO failed to take action when
Plaintiff complained that Sweeney was spreading
lies about him; ARCO accepted Sweeney's complaints and concluded Plaintiff was guilty without
consulting Plaintiff; Sweeney exposed her nude
body to Plaintiff; Sweeney enticed Plaintiff into
lending her thousands of dollars with no intention
of paying him back; and Sweeney spread falsehoods about Plaintiff. See Response, at 35-36.
[*33] [HN12]

(3) Defendants' actions caused Plaintiff
emotional distress; and,
(4) the resulting emotional distress was
severe.

Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.. 95 F.3d 396%
400 (5th Cir. 1996); MacArthur v. University of Texas
Health Center. 45 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir. 1995):
Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.. 14 F.3d
25 K 256 (5th Cir. 1993): Twvman v. Twvman. 855
S.W.2d 619. 621-22 (Tex. 1993). Liability 4ox outrageous conduct "should be found 'only where the conduct
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.'" Twvman. 855 S.W.2d at 621
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965));
accord MacArthur. 45 F.3d at 898. n9

n9 See Burden v. General Dynamics Corp.. 60
F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995) (summary judgment for
employer on claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress affirmed, rejecting Plaintiffs
allegations that, despite his excellent job performance, he suffered humiliation and health
problems when he was reclassified to an isolated
position, he was given no input into critical management decisions, he was ostracized and given
menial assignments, and his office and secretary
were taken away); Johnson v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 965 F.2d 31 (5th Cir.
1992) (summary judgment for employer on claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress affirmed, despite allegations that Plaintiff was told
that he did not "fit in" with the company, and that
his supervisor was extremely hostile, constandy
criticized him, threatened him with termination,
reassigned his sales territory and removed a sale
from his credits). Cf. Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie
Asphalt Co.. 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1993)
(calling employee "Mexican" or "wetback" does
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not support claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).

n i l Plaintiff made the "liar" allegations in his
Answers and Objections to Defendant ARCO
Chemical Company's First Interrogatories to
Plaintiff [Exhibit T to Motion] ("Answers and
Objections"), Interrogatory No. 19. Illustrative of
Plaintiffs allegations are the following:

[*34] [HN13]
An employer's conduct, even if a Title VII violation,
rises to the level of extreme and outrageous in only the
most unusual cases. See Hirras* 95 F.3d at 400 (citing
Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d 649, 654
(5th Cir. 1994)). Complaints that fall within the realm of
an ordinary employment dispute do not suffice for a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See
Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 965 F.2d
3h 33-34 (5th Cir. 1992).

1. By falsely telling Plaintiff that
all the people on the shift have
complained about me, and when I
ask the people and they deny even
talking to Eric, me going back to
Eric with this-then Eric going
around to each individual and telling them that I over-reacted and
that he is happy with the productivity of the shift—he is calling me
a liar and telling the people of my
shift that I do not know what I am
talking about.—Yet he uses this
material in my review as fact.

While some of Kolodziej's and Sweeney's nlO alleged misconduct may have been inappropriate or insensitive, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to
allege any facts sufficient to sustain his summary judgment burden on this intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim against Defendant ARCO. The alleged
conduct simply is not "so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.'" Twyman. 855 S.W.2d at 621 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this
claim.

8. By denying he asked to see my
"green card", is calling me a liar.
9. By denying he asked me to explain why I was in the United
State[s] for twenty year [sic] and
had yet to become an American
Citizen—is calling me a liar.

nlO For a discussion of ARCO's liability for
Sweeney's alleged conduct, see infra Part III.C.l
andIII.C.3.
[•35]
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Answers and Objections, at 25—26.
[*36]

C. Defamation and Slander Claims
Plaintiffs defamation claims are based on alleged
statements made by Sweeney and Kolodziej. Plaintiff
contends Kolodziej defamed him by stating that Plaintiff
was "balling" Sweeney and was a liar; nil Plaintiff also
maintains that Kolodziej said Plaintiff was insane, delusional, and irrational. nl2 See Plaintiffs Fourth Amended
Petition (Exhibit W to Motion) ("Petition") P 23. Plaintiff claims that Sweeney defamed him by claiming, inter
alia, that he stalked her, had sex with her, spied on her,
broke into her home, damaged her home, stole from her
purse, stole her answering machine, hid in her bushes,
damaged her property, threatened to kill her, and was
obsessed with her. See id. PP 20-23.

nl2 These claims were asserted by Plaintiff in his
First Supplemental Pleading [Doc. # 15] ("Supplemental Pleading"), which states that on January 23, 1998, Kolodziej stated to ARCO employee James Sullivan ("Sullivan") that plaintiff
was insane, delusional, and irrational. See Supplemental Pleading, PP 5-6. Plaintiff also claims
that since January 23, 1998, Kolodziej repeatedly
stated to ARCO employees in Pennsylvania and
Texas that Plaintiff was insane, delusional, and irrational. See id. P 7. Plaintiff could not identify
anyone other than Sullivan in Pennsylvania to
whom Kolodziej made the alleged comments, nor
did he present evidence that Kolodziej made the
remarks to anyone in Texas. See Martineau
Deposition, at 467, 506, 508-09, 511, 513-15,
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516. Accordingly, the Court addresses only the
statements allegedly made to Sullivan.
Defendant ARCO argues that Plaintiffs defamation
claims fail as a matter of law because ARCO is not liable
for Sweeney's or Kolodziej's alleged statements, and
because Kolodziej's statements are not actionable defamation. Plaintiff responds that [*37] material fact issues
remains on his defamation claims.
1. ARCO's Liability for Employee Statements
In Texas, [HN14] "an action is sustainable against a
corporation for defamation by its agent, if such defamation is referable to the duty owing by the agent to the
corporation, and was made while in the discharge of that
duty. Neither express authorization nor subsequent ratification is necessary to establish liability." Wagner v.
Caprock Beef Packers Co.. 540 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex.
1976).
Plaintiff argues that "Kolodziej's slander is sustainable against ARCO, because the defamation was made
while Kolodziej was discharging his duty to ARCO to
damage Plaintiffs reputation and to keep witnesses from
testifying against ARCO." Response, at 29. While Kolodziej's communications with John Sullivan were insensitive, the comments either fall into the general category
of unauthorized gossip or mere personal opinion. See
Affidavit of John Sullivan (Exhibit 36 to Response)
("Sullivan Affidavit"). Plaintiff has offered no summary
judgment evidence that Kolodziej's job duties or work
relationship to Plaintiff required discussions or speculation about his sex life or her uninformed personal [*38]
opinion about Plaintiffs psychological mental state. In
fact, Plaintiff admits that he has no evidence indicating
that Kolodziej's job tasks included the alleged name calling. See Martineau Deposition, at 489 ("I doubt if it
would be within his job duties. I don't know what his
duties of what his function is or what he's supposed to
do.").
Moreover, it is well established that [HN15] unauthorized gossip of employees or supervisors cannot be
imputed to an employer. See Danawala v. Houston
Lwhtinv & Power Co.. 14 F.3d 251. 255 (5th Cir, 1993)
(employer not responsible for "unauthorized gossip"
spread by co-workers); Patton v. United Parcel Serv..
Inc.. 910 F. Supp. 1250. 1274 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (same);
Marshall Fields Stores. Inc. v. Gardiner. 859 S.W.2d
39L 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (same). Plaintiff has simply offered no evidence—as opposed to Plaintiffs personal conclusions—to
establish genuine fact issues concerning whether and
how Kolodziej's duties to ARCO were to be advanced by
him making the allegedly defamatory statements about
Plaintiff. See Randall's. 891 S.W.2d 640. 647 (employee
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acted independently and outside scope of [*39] authority
when publishing statements to store's customers); Seifert.
567 S.W.2d 77, 78 (affirming summary judgment for
employer because employee acting outside scope of employment when he made defamatory statements);
Wazner. 540 S.W.2d at 304-05 (employer not liable
because manager "not about his employer's business"
when making phone calls spreading defamatory statements).
As to Sweeney, Plaintiff maintains that he has
"raised genuine issues of material fact that Lisa Sweeney,
an ARCO employee defamed him, in the course and
scope of her employment." Response, at 28. As in the
case of Kolodziej, however, Plaintiff has not offered
competent summary judgment evidence establishing fact
issues regarding whether Sweeney's alleged statements
were made as part of her duties to ARCO. n l 3 Plaintiffs
conclusory assertions based on his own self-interested
personal opinion are insufficient to raise a genuine fact
question in this context.

nl3 Plaintiff argues that Sweeney admitted that
she was acting in the course and scope of her employment at all times relevant to the lawsuit. Defendant notes correctly, however, that ARCO is
not bound by Sweeney's admissions. As noted,
supra, it is undisputed that the rumors Sweeney
allegedly was spreading were unauthorized
workplace gossip that as a matter of law cannot
be imputed to employers.
[*40]
Accordingly, Plaintiffs defamation claims cannot
survive summary judgment on this ground.
2. Merits of Kolodziej's Alleged Defamatory
Statements
In the alternative, ARCO argues that even if it were
liable for its employee Kolodziej's statements, the claim
fail for a variety of reasons.
a. The Alleged "Balling" and Various "Liar"
Comments
In its Motion, Defendant ARCO moved to dismiss
the alleged "balling" and "liar" comments. Plaintiff did
not respond to these arguments, and appears to have
abandoned these claims. See Response, at 10 n.2. Plaintiff only addresses his new, supplemental claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met his summary judgment
burden as to these allegations, and dismissal is appropriate. nl4 Accordingly, summary judgment must be
granted on this defamation claim.
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n!4 Even if Plaintiff had responded to Defendant's arguments, it is unlikely that his claims
would have survived summary judgment. Plaintiff claims that Kolodziej made the "balling"
statement in April 1996, when the two men were
alone in Plaintiffs office. See Martineau Deposition, at 265-67, 269. Plaintiff admits that Kolodziej never repeated the statement, and has no evidence that Kolodziej made the remark to anyone
else. See id. at 265-67.
In Texas, [HN16] libel and slander claims must
be brought within a year of the accrual of those
claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.002 fa) (Vernon 1986); Ross v. Arkwrizht Mut Ins. Co.. 892 S.W.2d 119. 131-32
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1994, no writ).
Accrual occurs on the date of communication, not
its consequences. See Ross. 892 S.W.2d at 1 3 1 32. Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until June 11,
1997, well past the statute of limitations deadline.
Therefore, any claim for the alleged "balling"
statement is now time-barred. Moreover, Plaintiff
admits that the alleged comment was made to
Plaintiff while the men were alone in Plaintiffs
office. "Slander is a defamatory statement that is
orally communicated or published to a third person without legal excuse." Randalls. 891 S.W.2d
at 646 (emphasis added).
As for the alleged "liar" comments, Defendant articulated many compelling reasons why the
statements would not be defamatory, including:
the statute of limitations bars some statements;
many are not capable of defamatory meaning;
there is no evidence of publication to third parties; many are statements of opinion. While the
Court need not and does not reach a conclusion
on the merits of these claims, the Court simply
observes in passing that their legal viability is
doubtful.
[*41]
b. Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claims
Plaintiff contends that Kolodziej told Sullivan that
Plaintiff was insane, irrational, and delusional. Defendant
ARCO, in its Supplemental Motion, argues that summary
judgment must be granted on these issues because: the
alleged statements are opinions; the alleged statements
are not defamatory; the alleged statements are privileged;
and Texas does not recognize compelled self-publication.
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Fact vs. Opinion.—A [HN17] statement is defamatory if the words tend to injure a person's reputation, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
financial injury. See Baldwin v. University of Texas
Medical Branch at Galveston. 945 F. Supp. 1022, 1035
(S.D. Tex. 1996), affdy 122 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1997):
Schauer v. Memorial Care Systems. 856 S.W.2d 437%
446 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1993, no writ);
Einhorn v. LaChance. 823 S.W.2d 405, 410-11 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1992, writ dismM w.o.j.).
Whether a document or statement is reasonably capable
of a defamatory meaning is an issue of law for the court.
See Baldwin. 945 F. Supp. at 1034-35; Musser v. Smith
Protective Services. Inc.. f*42] 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55
(Tex. 1987). "All assertions of opinion are protected by
the first amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution." Carr
v. Brasher. 116 S.W.2d 567. 570 Hex. 1989). Thus, an
essential element of a defamation cause of action is that
the alleged defamatory statement be a statement of fact
rather than opinion. See Howell v. Hecht. 821 S.W.2d
627, 631 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied); AJjL
Belo Corp. v. Rayzor. 644 S.W.2d 71, 79 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1982, writ refd n.r.e.). Whether a statement
is an opinion or an assertion of fact is also a question of
law. nl5 See Carr. 116 S.W.2d at 570.

nl5 The Texas appellate court in Yiamouyiannis
listed helpful factors in making the fact/opinion
determination:
[HN18]
In distinguishing between fact and
opinion, the court should (1) analyze the common usage of the specific language to determine
whether it has a precise, well understood core of meaning that
conveys facts, or whether the
statement is indefinite and ambiguous; (2) assess the statement's
verifiability, that is, whether it is
objectively capable of being
proven true or false; (3) consider
the entire context of the article or
column, including cautionary language; and (4) evaluate the kind of
writing or speech as to its presentation as commentary or "hard"
news. 750 F.2d at 978-84. This inquiry should help determine, for
example, whether the statement is
to be taken as precise and literal or
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loose and figurative, and whether
the language is employed as metaphor or hyperbole, or to convey
actual facts.

Yiamouyiannis. 764 S.W.2d 338, 341 (relying on
the four-part test set forth in Oilman v. Evans.
242 U.S. APP. D C 301. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir.
1984)). This test has been adopted by several
Texas courts. See, e.g., Yiamouyiannis v. Thompson. 764 S.W.2d 338. 341 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr,
706 S.W.2d 797. 798 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1986,
writ ref d n.r.e.). The Texas Supreme Court, however, has not adopted these factors. See Carr. 776
S.W.2d at 570.

were not reasonably capable of defamatory meaning and the statements were subject to a qualified
privilege.
Slander Per Se.--In his Supplemental Response,
Plaintiff also argues that Kolodziej's alleged statements
were slander per se.
[HN19] "Statements are slanderous per se if they
are so obviously harmful to the person harmed that no
proof of their injurious effect is necessary to make them
actionable. Matters characterized as slanderous per se are
statements that affect a person injuriously in his office,
profession, [*45] or occupation." Simmons v. Ware. 920
S.W.2d 438, 451 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ)
(citations omitted). The Simmons court explained:

[*43]
Having reviewed the record, and the context in
which Kolodziej's statements allegedly were made, the
Court determines that Plaintiff complains of nonactionable opinions. As Defendant argues, the words
were used in a figurative, rather than literal, sense. Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that Kolodziej used the
terms literally, and it is undisputed that Kolodziej had no
professional training that would enable him to make a
professional evaluation. See Kolodziej Affidavit, P 6;
Martineau Deposition, at 496-98, 531-32. In fact, Sullivan characterized Kolodziej's remarks as "views." See
Martineau Deposition, at 533; Sullivan Affidavit, P 4.
Finally, as Defendant notes, words such as those allegedly used by Kolodziej commonly are used hyperbolically, rather than literally, and as such express opinion
instead of fact. Cf. Yiamouyuannis. 1(A S.W.2d at 341
(remarks that plaintiff was a "quack," "hoke artist," and
"fear monger," were "vintage hyperbole" and "pure opinion"); Einhorn v. LaChance. 823 S.W.2d 405. 412 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (descriptions of plaintiff as "incompetent, troublemakers
and liars" absolutely privileged opinions). [*44]
Accordingly, even if the Court found that liability
for Kolodziej's alleged statements could be imputed to
Defendant ARCO, the Court concludes that the remarks
in question were merely opinion, and therefore subject to
privilege. nl6 Summary judgment is therefore appropriate on this alternative ground on PlaintifTs supplemental
slander claims.

nl6 Additionally, Defendant ARCO raised and
briefed several other strong arguments for dismissal of this claim, including: the statements
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In determining whether a statement is actionable, the statements in their entirety
must be examined. They must be construed as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances and judged as a person
of ordinary intelligence would perceive
them. It is only if the statements are ambiguous or of doubtful import that a jury
is called upon to determine their meaning
and effect upon an ordinary person.

Id.
Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes
that, for the reasons stated supra, no reasonable person
would perceive Kolodziej's alleged statements as slanderous per se. Accordingly, PlaintifTs slander claim cannot survive summary judgment on this ground.
3. Ratification of Sweeney's Statements
Plaintiff further claims that ARCO is responsible for
Sweeney's alleged comments because it ratified them.
Plaintiff claims that ARCO managers were made aware
of Sweeney's comments on four different occasions, but
failed to take any action to stop the defamation. n!7

n!7 Plaintiff states:

In mid to late August 1996, Plaintiff told Sammy Durett, the shift
superintendent and Eric Kolodziej,
his immediate supervisor, that
Sweeney
had
been
"badPage 16
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mouthing" for four to five months
and he wanted this stopped. In
September 1996, Plaintiff complained to Kolodziej and Jetola
Anderson, the human resources
representative, that he had heard
from plan operators that he was
demoted for sexual harassment
and that Sweeney was continuing
to bad mouth him. In late September 1996, Plaintiff told Kolodziej
and Anderson that he heard from
lab technicians that Sweeney said
the following falsehoods about
him: 1) He broke into Sweeney's
home 2) He damaged her home 3)
He stole out of her purse 4) He
stalked her and 5) He was obsessed with her. He again asked
that something be done to stop the
spreading of these lies. In early
October 1996, Plaintiff again
complained to Kolodziej and
Anderson about the specific falsehoods that were being said about
him and asked that they be
stopped.

46,011

instructed Sweeney unambiguously in an October meeting not to gossip about Plaintiff. See Sweeney Deposition, at 202-03. Plaintiff has proffered no evidence disputing [*47] these facts. Instead, he claims that he complained about Sweeney in "mid to late" August and in
September of 1996, yet to his knowledge, nothing was
done at that time. ARCO denies this claim, but in any
event, these facts are insufficient to raise a summary
judgment issue as to ratification. nl9 Six weeks is not an
unreasonable time period for an employer to investigate
a complex situation as the one Plaintiff and Sweeney
presented. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of fact issues regarding ARCO's alleged ratification of Sweeney's statements.

nl8 ARCO maintains that it had no actual knowledge of Sweeney's alleged acts. It is undisputed
that the original statements were not made on
ARCO's behalf.
nl9 Moreover, Plaintiff admitted that his alleged
complaints of August and September 1996 regarded alleged "rumors" and "bad mouthing" that
he wanted ARCO to "put an end to." Martineau
Deposition, at 337. As discussed, supra, employers are not responsible for workplace rumors or
gossip. Plaintiff further admits that he did not
complain about specific alleged statements until
October 1996, when ARCO warned Sweeney not
to spread allegations.

Response, at 30—31. Sweeney confirms that she
was instructed in the October meeting not to gossip about Plaintiff. See Sweeney Deposition, at
148.
[*48]
[*46] [HN20]
"Ratification may occur when the employer . . . confirms, adopts, or fails to repudiate that acts of its employee." Prunty v, Arkansas Freightways. Inc.* 16 F.3d
649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Moreover,
"when the company 1) knows about the employee's acts,
2) recognizes that the employee's acts will continue is he
is retained, 3) does nothing to prevent the ongoing tortious acts, and 4) chooses to retain the employee, the
company ratifies the tortious acts . . . . " Id. at 654.
ARCO argues that it cannot be liable based on its
failure to repudiate Sweeney's acts. Even assuming
ARCO had knowledge of Sweeney's comments, nl8 the
summary judgment evidence indicates no likelihood that
Sweeney's comments would continue if she were retained. The company took action in October 1996. Both
Kolodziej and Anderson instructed Sweeney to refrain
from discussing the matter with other ARCO employees.
See Anderson Affidavit, P 13; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 14.
Moreover, in response to Plaintiffs complaints, ARCO

4. ARCO's Liability for Self-Publication or RePublication
Plaintiff finally argues that ARCO is liable under the
legal theory of "self-defamation" or "compelled republication," relying on two intermediate Texas appellate
courts that held that an employer may be liable for the
employee's own publication of the employer's defamatory statements under certain circumstances. See First
State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake. 606 S.W.2d 696,
701-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.); Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico. 696 S.W.2d 439,
446 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
ARCO counters that the Texas Supreme Court has never
recognized these theories, citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144
Tex. 90. 188S.W.2d770. 772 (Tex. 1945).
Plaintiff claims in his Supplemental Pleading that
"he has had to repeat [Kolodziej's] defamatory statements to prospective employers and to family and
friends, causing further damage through self-
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defamation." Supplemental Pleading, P 14. Plaintiff admitted in deposition, inconsistent with his pleading, that
he has not repeated the alleged statements to any prospective employers. See Martineau Deposition, at 533.
The Court finds [*49] and concludes that even if the
Texas Supreme Court were to adopt this theory, Plaintiff
could not meet the requirements for this cause of action.
The two cases cited by Plaintiff both rely upon "comment m" to S 557 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS. See First State Bank. 606 S.W.2d at 701:
Chasewood Constr. Co.. 696 S.W.2d 439. 446. The Restatement requires the defamed person to show that when
he published the remark, (1) he was unaware of the defamatory nature of the statement, n20 and (2) circumstances indicated that the communication to the third
party would be likely. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 557 cmt. m; Doe v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp.. 855 S.W.2d 248. 259 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993),
affd as modified on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347, 356
(Tex. 1995). Plaintiff does not claim that he was unaware
of the defamatory nature of the alleged statement, nor
does he offer evidence indicating any lack of awareness.
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs defamation claims cannot
survive summary judgment on the theory of selfpublication or re-publication.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes
that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[Doc. # 17], and Defendant ARCO Chemical Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 29], are GRANTED in
their entirety. Plaintiff has failed to raise genuine questions of material fact concerning essential elements of his
Title VII claims, his intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, and his defamation claims. It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Doc. # 17], and Defendant ARCO
Chemical Company's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 29] are
GRANTED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 23d day of December, 1998.
NANCY F. ATLAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

n20 The Ahe and Rico courts omit the first Restatement requirement: that the defamed persons
demonstrate that he was unaware of the defamatory nature of the matter. See Ake. 606 S.W.2d at
IQURico. 696 S.W.2d at 446. As another appellate court has noted, however, this first requirement is essential because otherwise "the defamed
party is under no duty to mitigate its damages by
refraining to self-publish known defamatory
statements." Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp..
855 S.W.2d 248. 259 (Tex. App.-Austin), affd
as modified on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347,
356 (Tex. 1995)

FINAL JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in this Court's Memorandum
and Order, dated December 23d 1998, this civil action is
DISMISSED.
This is a final judgment.
The Clerk will enter [*51] this Order and provide
all parties with a true copy.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 23d day of December, 1998.
NANCY F. ATLAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

[*50]
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ment. Ohio law did not recognize a tort of negligent investigation of an employee's misconduct.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the summary judgment
in favor of the employer and investigators.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs, employee and
spouse, appealed a judgment from the Common Pleas
Court, Summit County (Ohio), which granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants, employer and investigators, on claims of defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent investigation, and loss of
services and consortium.
OVERVIEW: The employee was fired for sexually harassing another employee and was denied unemployment
benefits. He contended that the investigation was conducted in an outrageous and negligent manner. The court
affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the employer and investigators. The trial court,
in finding that the employee's bare assertions failed to
rebut the motion adequately, as required by Ohio R. Civ.
P. 56(E), did not place the initial burden upon the employee. The record did not support the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to the defamation claim, the employee failed to set forth specific facts
showing that statements to co-workers were made in
furtherance of the employer's business. Moreover, an
employer was not liable for an employee's intentional,
malicious torts performed outside the scope of employ-

CORE TERMS: summary judgment, chandler, cause of
action, sexual harassment, assignments of error, nonmoving party, assignment of error, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, granting summary judgment, moving
party, defamation, consortium, properly granted, furtherance, co-workers, bare, journal entry, infliction of emotional distress, genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment motion, allegedly defamatory, entitled to
judgment, burden of proof, genuine issue, material fact,
matter of law, court erred, flirtatious, outrageous, depositions
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Discovery > Methods > General
Overview
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Motions for
Summary Judgment > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Time Limitations
[HN1] Pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 56(C). a party's motion for summary judgment shall be granted if, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
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evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of
fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is
no genuine issue as to a ay material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists rests with the moving party. However, Rule 56(E)
provides that when a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported by evidence as provided in the rule,
the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial.

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Motions for
Summary Judgment > (General Overview
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De
Novo Review
[HN2] In reviewing a summary judgment, both trial and
appellate courts adopt the same standard. Both courts
construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party. Pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 56(C), a reviewing court will affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment if it finds that: (1) No genuine issues as
to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and
(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom
the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that panrty.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Harassment > Sexual Harassment > Employer Liability >
Coworkers
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Harassment > Sexual Harassment > Employment Practices
> Discharges & Failures to Hire
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Activities &
Conditions > Intentional Torts
[HN5] In Ohio, an employer is not liable for an employee's intentional, malicious torts performed outside
the scope of employment

Torts > Business Torts > Negligent Hiring & Supervision
[HN6] Negligent investigation of an employee's misconduct is not a cause of action recognized in Ohio law.
COUNSEL:
JOHN L. WOLFE, Attorney at Law, Akron, Ohio,
for Plaintiffs.
GREGORY L. HAMMOND, Attorney at Law, Akron, Ohio, for Defendants.
JUDGES:
William R. Baird, for the court. Quillin, P. J., Cacioppo, J., concur.
OPINION BY:
BAIRD

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review
Torts > Negligence > Actions > Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress > General Overview
[HN3] The appellate court need not address any issue
which was not first raised in the trial court.

Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General
Overview
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > General
Overview
[HN4] Under respondeat superior, the test of an employer's liability for an employee's allegedly defamatory
statements is not simply whether the employee was in its
employ, but whether the statements were made in the
furtherance of the employer's business and under the
general direction of the employer.

OPINION:
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial
court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the
following disposition is made:
This cause comes before the court upon the appeal
of Perry and Annette Lamson from the trial court's order
granting summary judgment in favor the defendantappellees, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (Firestone), Charles Ramsey, Jr., and Jacqueline C. Steese.
We affirm.
Perry Lamson was employed by Firestone as a security guard from June 24, 1968, to April 28, 1986. He was
fired by Firestone for sexually harassing Jacqueline
Chandler, another Firestone employee. Steese, a Firestone personnel respresentative, and Ramsey, head of
Firestone's Equal Employment Opportunity Department,
conducted the investigation into Chandler's complaint of
harassment, which led to Perry's dismissal.
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Perry [*2] contends that the investigation into
Chandler's charges was conducted in both an outrageous
and negligent manner, because Steese and Ramsey failed
to discover that Lamson did not engage in sexual harassment, but instead took part in a consensual, mutually
flirtatious relationship" with Chandler.
Immediately following his dismissal, Perry applied
for unemployment benefits. The Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES) denied his application after
determining that Perry was dismissed for just cause. The
decision of the OBES was upheld on appeal to the
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas. Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Aug. 20, 1987), Wayne C.P.
No. 87-C1-038, unreported. Perry then filed a reverse
sexual discrimination suit against Firestone in the United
States District Court. Perry alleged that he and Chandler
had engaged in a consensual, mutually flirtatious relationship, for which only he was fired and Chandler was
not. The district court granted Firestone's motion for
summary judgment, finding that Firestone had articulated
a nondiscriminatory reason for Perry's dismissal, i.e.
sexual harassment of chandler. Lamson v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. (Dec. 15, [*3] 1987), U.S. Dist. Gt. No.
C87-898A, unreported. The decision of the District Court
was upheld on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. (Nov. 4, 1988), C.A. 6 No. 88-3050, unreported.
The Lamsons then brought the instant action in the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, asserting the
following claims for relief: defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent investigation of
Chandler's sexual harassment charges, and a claim for
Annette's loss of Perry's services and consortium. On
April 20, 1990, the appellees filed a motion for summary
judgment as to all claims, which the trial court granted
on June 29, 1990.
The Lamsons appeal the trial court's ruling, and raise
six assignments of error, all directed toward the propriety
of the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Assignment of Error VI
"The court erred in placing the burden of proof in
opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiffs-appellees (the nonmoving parties) rather
than requiring the moving parties to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists."
Because the Lamsons' sixth assignment of error
challenges [*4] the standard under which the trial court
reviewed the appellees' motion for summary judgment,
we will address this claimed error first.
In its order granting summary judgment to the appellees, the trial court noted that appellants "failed to prove
genuine issues of material fact exist." Appellants seize

upon this statement as proof that the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof upon the nonmoving
party. We disagree.
[HN1] Pursuant to Civ. R. 56(C). a party's motion
for summary judgment shall be granted if, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party,
"* * * the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of
fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * *
The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests with the moving party. Harless v.
Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 64,
66. However, Civ. R. 56(E) provides that when a motion
for summary judgment is made [*5] and supported by
evidence as provided in the rule, the nonmoving party
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue^of fact for trial."
The trial court found that the appellants' bare assertions failed to adequately rebut the appellees' motion, as
required by Civ. R. 56(E). It did not place the initial burden upon appellants.
Appellants' sixth assignment of error is overruled.
Assignments of Error
"I. The court erred in granting defendants' summary
judgment [sic] on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's .cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
"II. The court erred in granting defendants' summary
judgment [sic] on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
"III. The court erred in granting defendants' summary judgment motion on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's
cause of action for defamation.
"IV. The court erred in granting defendants' summary judgment motion on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's
cause of action for negligence.
"V. The court erred in granting summary judgment
on plaintiff Annette Lamson's cause of action for loss of
services and consortium."
Because appellants' remaining assignments [*6] of
error all challenge the propriety of the trial court's grant
of summary judgment, we will address them together.
[HN2] In reviewing a summary judgment, both trial
and appellate courts adopt the same standard. Both courts
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construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party. Toledo's Great Eastern Shoppers City, Inc.
v. Abde's Black Angus Steak House No. Ill, Inc. (1986),
24 Ohio St. 3d 198. 201-202. Pursuant to Civ. 56(C), a
reviewing court will ailirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment if it finds that:
"* * *
"(1) No genuine issues as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that
party."
»»* * * "

forth specific facts showing that Chandler's statements to
her co-workers were made in furtherance of Firestone's
business.
Second, the general rule [HN5] in Ohio is that an
employer is not liable for an employee's intentional, malicious torts performed outside the scope of employment
Taylor v. Doctors Hospital (1985). 21 Ohio App. 3d 154.
156. Perry failed to set forth specific facts demonstrating
how Chandler's statements to co-workers regarding sexual harassment by Perry fell within the scope of Chandler's employment as a secretary. The trial court properly
granted summary judgment to the appellees on this
claim.

Temple v. Wean United. Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St 2d
317.327.

In his fourth claim for relief, Perry urges this court
to adopt the previously unrecognized tort of [HN6] negligent investigation of an employee's misconduct. We
decline to do so. The trial court properly granted appellees' summary judgment on this claim for the reason that
no such cause of action exists in Ohio law.

As for his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the record, and most particularly the
depositions of Perry, Steese, and Ramsey, fails to support
Perry's bare assertions [*7] that the investigation of
Chandler's charges of sexual harassment was conducted
in such an outrageous manner as to go beyond all bounds
of decency and become intolerable in a civilized community. See, Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio
St. 3d 369. 374-375. The trial court properly granted
appellees summary judgment on this claim.

Finally, [*9] the trial court, having granted appellees summary judgment on each of Perry's claims for
relief, also granted appellees summary judgment on Annette's claims for loss of Perry's services and consortium.
We find no error in this, as Annette's claim was derivative of Perry's. Messmore v. Monarch Machine Tool Co.
(1983). 11 Ohio App. 3d 67. 68. As such, it would not
exist but for Perry's, and cannot survive the dismissal of
Perry's claims. Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989). 44 Ohio
St 3d 11. 14.
Summary

As for Perry's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, we note that this claim was neither pled in
the complaint, nor addressed by the trial court. [HN3]
This court need not address any issue which was not first
raised in the trial court. Seelev v. Rahe (1985), 16 Ohio
St. 25. 26.

We overrule all of the appellants' assignments of error and affirm the trial court order granting appellees'
motion for summary judgment in all respects.

In his claim for defamation, Perry argues that Chandler's allegedly defamatory statements were "published"
by Chandler within the course of her employment when,
prior to appellees' investigation, she told fellow employees of Perry's harassment. Appellant proceeded on a theory of respondeat superior to hold Firestone liable for
Chandler's statements.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this
court, directing the County of Summit Common Pleas
Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified
copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate,
pursuant to App. R. 27.

Perry's theory of recovery fails in two respects. First,
[HN4] under respondeat superior, the test of Firestone's
liability for Chandler's allegedly defamatory statements
is not simply whether Chandler [*8] was in Firestone's
employ, but whether the statements were made in the
furtherance of Firestone's business and under the general
direction of Firestone. See, Halkias v. Wilkoff Co.
(1943), 141 Ohio St. 139. 152-153. Perry has failed to set

The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds
for this appeal.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document
shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall
be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at
which time the period for review shall begin to run.
[*10] App. R. 22(E).
Costs taxed to appellants.
Exceptions.
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I. THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE
DEMONSTRATED BIAS,
PREJUDICE
AND
HOSTILITY
TOWARDS APPELLANT THEREBY
PREVENTING HER FROM OBTAINING
A FAIR TRIAL.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL [*2] PREJUDICE OF
APPELLANT EXCLUDING CERTAIN
RELEVANT
AND
ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE WHICH PREVENTED HER
FROM OBTAINING A FAIR TRIAL.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE
OF
APPELLANT BY REFUSING TO
PERMIT ONE OF HER KEY WITNESSES
TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL AND BY
SEVERELY LIMITING THE TESTIMONY
OF ANOTHER PRIMARY WITNESS
CALLED BY APPELLANT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE
OF
APPELLANT BY
GRANTING A
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DIRECTED VERDICT FOR APPELLEES
AND SPECIFICALLY FOR APPELLEE,
EMMCO CORPORATION.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE
OF
APPELLANT BY REFUSING TO
PERMIT HER TO FULLY AMEND HER
COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED PURSUANT
TO CIVR. 15(B).
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE
OF
APPELLANT IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE
JURY
MISSTATING THE
ELEMENTS OF DEFAMATION AND
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON SLANDER PER SE.
Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and
the arguments presented by the parties, we affirm in part
and reverse in part. The apposite facts follow.
Rebecca Corradi was employed by EMMCO Corporation from November 21, 1988 to January 15, 1991.
Emmco hired her as [*3J their business manager of their
Columbus Park Apartments in Bedford Heights; later she
became their property manager. As property manager,
she was responsible for collecting and processing rent
payments. Additionally, she was in charge of handling
tenants' complaints and facilitating the repairs needed in
the apartments.
Her immediate supervisor was David Heffelman,
Director of Residential Properties for EMMCO. In 1990,
Corradi's relationship with HetTelman and her other superiors began to deteriorate. They complained because
too much money was being spent on outside contractors
for repairs that could have been done by in-house maintenance people. They complained particularly about the
amount of work given to Danny Venturella as a plumbing contractor.
On January 15, 1991, Heffelman had a private meeting with Corradi. In the meeting, he informed Corradi
"EMMCO had decided to make a management change"
and she should not take it personally. He then told her,
"You can resign and have a letter of recommendation, or
you can be terminated and take your chances." Corradi
refused to resign. Upon leaving the office, Corradi told
Mary Carpenter, she had just been fired. In a termination
report [*4] form, Heffelman indicated the reason for her
discharge was incompetence.
When she arrived at her home she was told by her
mother-in-law to call Irene Soltis. Irene Soltis was employed at the apartment building as office manager, and

Corradi was her supervisor. When she called, Soltis was
extremely upset, crying, and told Corradi, "I can't work
there if you are not going to be there, what am I going to
do?" Corradi talked to Soltis on one subsequent occasion
to make arrangements to pick up her last paycheck, drop
off petty cash, and money collected from rental of the
complex party room.
Barbara Van Hala, a part-time employee, told Corradi that it was rumored that she was fired for receiving
kickbacks from subcontractors, particularly Venturella.
Corradi said several others knew of the rumor. Upon
learning of the rumor she felt ashamed, angry, and humiliated.
Corradi's sisters-in-law, Sharon Banks and Beverly
D'Ambrosia went to the rental office to visit Corradi.
Banks was a tenant of Columbus Park Apartments at the
time. Soltis informed Banks and D'Ambrosia that Corradi was fired because she was taking money from petty
cash. Soltis also told Melissa Brearey, who was a mutual
friend [*5] of Soltis and Corradi, that Corradi was discharged for removing carpeting and appliances from
Columbus Park Apartments.
Prior to Corradi's discharge, the management office
of Columbus Park Apartments began receiving hang-up
and threatening telephone calls. After Corradi was discharged, Soltis went to the Bedford Heights Police Department to report the harassing telephone calls. Soltis
provided the police with Corradi's name as one of several
possible suspects. The police contacted Corradi to discuss the allegations, but did not pursue an investigation.
In March of 1991, Corradi applied for the position of
credit collections manager with Associated Estates Realty Corporation. She was referred to the company by her
attorney and interviewed with the company's Comptroller, Regina Shaw. Shaw offered her the job, and she was
to start Monday, the day after the interview. After the
interview, she was sent to Associated's Human Resources department to pick-up the necessary paper work.
Corradi completed the paperwork and returned it. Nan
Zielenic was director of Human Resources for Associated; it was her responsibility to check references of prospective employees, but she had no independent [*6]
recollection of doing so for Corradi. However, after Corradi turned in her paperwork including her references,
she received a telephone call from Shaw rescinding the
job offer.
Corradi filed an action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against EMMCO,
Heffelman, and Soltis. After discovery, the case proceeded to a jury trial before Judge James P. Kilbane. At
the close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court entered a
directed verdict in favor of EMMCO and Heffelman. The
claims against Soltis were submitted to the jury. In their
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interrogatories the jury found Soltis made false statements and published the statements, but the statements
did not cause any injury to Corradi's reputation. The jury
entered a verdict in favor of Soltis. Corradi moved for a
new trial. While the motion was pending, Corradi filed a
notice of appeal. The motion was denied for want of jurisdiction, and this appeal followed.
Corradi's assignments of error will be addressed out
of order in the interest of clarity.
In her fourth assignment of error, Corradi asserts the
trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of
EMMCO and HeiTelman. Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides when
a [*7] motion for directed verdict has been properly
made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence
most strongly in favor of the party against whom the
motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative
issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion
upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and
direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue. See,
also, Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc.
(1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 97, 109, 592 N.E.2d 828. An action for defamation requires proof of "(1) an unprivileged
communication; (2) false and defamatory language about
another; and (3) requisite malice. A qualified privilege
attaches to statements made within the scope of employment." Nichols v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (June 23,
1994), 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2697, Cuyahoga App.
No. 65376, unreported.
In her fourth assignment of error, Corradi makes
several arguments. First, she argues the trial court erred
in granting a directed verdict in favor of Heffelman.
Mere allegations that rumors seem to reflect an employee's conversations with management are insufficient
to establish management was responsible [*8] for publication of defamatory remarks. Turk v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (Mar. 22, 1990), 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
1072, Cuyahoga App. No. 56749, unreported. Rumors in
and of themselves are not sufficient proof of a claim of
defamation. Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center (1990),
68 Ohio App. 3d 359, 588 N.E.2d 280. The spreading of
rumors or gossip is only actionable as defamation to the
extent that the statements made were attributable to the
defendant. See Cooper v. Foster (Feb. 14, 1989), Franklin App. No. 88 AP-326, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 567,
unreported. In this case, there was no evidence Heffelman made any defamatory statements about Corradi or
spread any rumors. Thus, the trial court properly directed
a verdict in favor of Heffelman.
Secondly, Corradi argues the trial court erred in
granting a directed verdict in favor of EMMCO because
is was liable for the defamatory statements made by
Soltis. Where an employee commits an intentional tort, it

must be calculated to facilitate or promote the business
for which that person is employed. "The employer/ principal is not liable for the independent, self-serving conduct of its employee/agent which does not so facilitate
[*9] its business." Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church of
Columbus, Ohio, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 737,
612 N.E.2d 357 (where giving personal opinion outside
scope of employment in defamation action).
In this case, Soltis was employed by EMMCO and
assumed some of the responsibilities of Corradi after
Corradi was discharged. Her responsibilities did not include providing information regarding the reasons for
Corradfs discharge from EMMCO and there is no evidence her remarks tended to "facilitate or promote"
EMMCO's business. Id. Accordingly, Soltis was acting
outside the scope of her employment, and therefore, the
trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of
EMMCO.
In her first assignment of error, Corradi asserts she
was denied a fair trial because the trial judge demonstrated bias, prejudice, and hostility toward her. "A trial
judge is presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and the
party alleging bias or prejudice must set forth evidence to
overcome the presumption of integrity." State v. Wagner
(1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 88, 93, 608 N.E.2d 852; citing
State v. Richard (Dec. 5, 1991), 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
5772, Cuyahoga App. No. 61524. The existence of
prejudice [*10] or bias against a party is a matter that is
peculiarly within the knowledge and reflection of each
individual judge and is difficult to question unless the
judge specifically verbalizes personal bias or prejudice
toward a party. In re: Adoption of Reams (1989), 52
Ohio App. 3d 52, 59, 557 N.E.2d 159.
Corradi again advances several arguments in her
first assignment of error. First, she argues the trial judge
demonstrated open, blatant hostility and bias toward William Corradi. William Corradi is the husband of Rebecca
Corradi and a special Cleveland Police Officer employed
at Cleveland House of Corrections. During direct examination of William Corradi, when he was asked what shift
he worked for the Cleveland Police Department, Judge
James P. Kilbane interceded and said, "Wait. Since I was
a policeman of the Cleveland Police Department, he is
not a member of the Cleveland Police Department. I
have got to protect them." Corradi argues the trial judge's
comment was prejudicial.
[A] trial judge has a duty to see that the truth is developed and should not hesitate to pose a proper, pertinent, and evenhanded question when justice requires."
Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen [*11] Oil
Serv., Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 591, 610, 611 N.E.2d
955. See, also, State v. Johnston (Dec. 15, 1993), 1993
Ohio App. LEXIS 6139, Summit App. No. 16137. None-

Page 4
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 510, *

theless, a trial judge's participation by questioning or
comment must be "scrupulously limited" to prevent the
court from indicating to the jury, "consciously or unconsciously," its opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses. State, ex rel Wise, v. Chand (1970), 21 Ohio St.
2d 113, 256 N.E.2d 613 at paragraph three of the syllabus. If the intensity, tenor, range and persistence of the
trial court's questions or comments can reasonably indicate to the jury the court's opinion as to the credibility of
the witness or the weight to be given to his testimony,
the interrogation is prejudicially erroneous. Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus.
In this case, the comment of the trial judge evinces a
strong feeling for the Cleveland Police Department.
Nonetheless, the trial judge's intemperate comment does
not in itself indicate bias, See Wagner at 94. Also, no
other evidence exists that would tend to show prejudice
against this witness. Albeit a minor point in this case, the
clarification of the witness' [*12] occupation was a
proper subject of comment. Thus, this court must conclude the jury was not prejudiced by the trial judge's
comments.
Corradi next argues the trial judge showed hostility
and bias toward Regina Shaw as a plaintiffs witness.
During the voir dire of Shaw outside the presence of the
jury, the trial judge interrogated her as follows:

MR. SILBERMAN: Ms. Shaw, could you
tell the Court how I came to refer Ms.
Corradi to you.
THE COURT: I'm satisfied that you're an
attorney, and that's why you referred her.
But, on the matter of the voir dire, you
can't establish anything [*13] in this particular case. I so rule. Call your next witness. Call the jury in. You're excused.
The trial judge's questioning of whether Shaw was a
friend of plaintiffs counsel was clearly a biased, improper interrogation into the credibility of a witness.
Nevertheless, the interrogation took place outside the
presence of the jury; therefore, it was not prejudicial. The
matter of whether Shaw should have been permitted to
testify will be fully addressed in response to Corradi's
third assignment of error.
Corradi next argues the trial judge made derogatory
comments reflecting upon the integrity of plaintiffs
counsel by referring to him as "Thomas Shaughnessy."
The four separate occasions during trial irr which the
reference was made were as follows:

Q: So this meeting was unusual?
A: I thought -

THE COURT: I know you're a friend MR. BARNARD: Objection.
MS. SHAW: No, I'm not a friend, Your
Honor. I don't even know them from
Adam. I interviewed Rebecca Corradi one
time. That's the only time I ever met the
woman.
THE COURT: I'm talking about with her
attorney.
MS. SHAW: I'm not friends with her attorney. I was talking to him about a
statement. I'm not friends of anybody
here.
THE COURT: I don't imply that your testimony is colored, but there is no testimony that —
MS. SHAW: I just feel like there's a lot of
facts here that are not going to get out,
'cause of the position —

A: I thought it was very unusual.
THE COURT: That's a comment. I will
put you over there with Thomas Shaughnessy. He's a great defense attorney. You
can't —

Q: If I understand your testimony, you
had never - did you ask —
THE COURT: This is Shaughnessy's
stuff. You have asked the question. Ask
him the question, not what [*14] you
think he said. Please.

Q: I want to know what.
MR. BARNARD: Objection.
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THE COURT: He said he doesn't have
any specific items. And again - can I call
you Tom?
MR. SILBERMAN: Your Honor, he just
testified yes, but he doesn't ~
THE COURT: Well, I don't want to argue
with you. Ask your next question. Even
Shaughnessy knows enough to keep quiet
after that. This is off the record.

Q: And that one was not, was it?
A: No.
MR. BARNARD: Objection. Relevance.
THE COURT: Sustained. It is - it is a
comment, again, Mr. Shaughnessy. Pardon me. Your name is Silberman. It is a
comment on the evidence. Ignore it.
MR. SILBERMAN: Thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: You are welcome.

The trial court's association of plaintiff s counsel was
clearly inappropriate, but there is no evidence the trial
judge harbored hostility or attempted to impugn the integrity of plaintiffs counsel. Therefore, these four remarks were not prejudicial.
Corradi next argues the trial judge had ex parte
communications with defense counsel. During the trial
and outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge
stated, Tve been approached by defense [*15] attorney
that he has a motion to make, he wants to voir dire the
next potential witness. Okay. You may. You want to call
her in or argue? There's a voir dire?" Later in the course
of the proceedings the trial judge stated, "We are in
chambers, and I have been approached by the Plaintiffs
attorney and - I mean the defense attorney, and he indicates he wants to put something on the record as to an
objection to certain types of witnesses." Corradi contends
there were apparently ex parte communications and the
resulting rulings denied her a fair trial.
Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
"A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right

to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized
by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other
communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding. * * * Nothing contained herein, however,
shall preclude a judge from non-substantive ex parte
communications on procedural matters and matters affecting prompt disposal of the business of the court."
It appears from the record in this case that defense
counsel had ex parte communications [*16] with the
trial judge on two occasions. It also, however, appears
the content of those communications were involved in
non-substantive matters. Merely asking a trial judge to
entertain a motion or permit counsel to place an objection on the record in an ex parte conversation is not a
violation of Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, the record clearly indicates defense
counsel's motion and objection were fully and fairly resolved in the presence of plaintiffs counsel. Therefore,
any ex parte conversations, did not deny Corradi a fair
trial. See Bland v. Graves (1994), 99 Ohio App. 3d 123,
136-138, 650 N.E.2d 117.
Corradi next argues the trial judge reached conclusions about the admissibility of certain evidence before
the testimony was proffered thereby precluding her from
obtaining a fair trial. A trial judge's opinions of law, even
if erroneous, are not by themselves evidence of bias or
prejudice. In re Disqualification of Murphy (1988), 36
Ohio St. 3d 605, 522 N.E.2d 459. In this case, the trial
judge's premature conclusions about certain evidence
raises a question of the admissibility of the evidence, not
one of alleged bias of the trial [*17] judge. The question
of admissibility of the evidence will be addressed in response to Corradi's second assignment of error.
Corradi also argues the trial judge erred to the substantial prejudice of the defendant by instructing the jury
to only consider certain witnesses. This argument is also
one which raises a question of law, not of bias. This
question will be addressed in response to Corradi's sixth
assignment of error.
Corradi next argues the cumulative effect of the trial
judge's conduct prevented her from obtaining a fair trial.
During the course of the voir dire of Rebecca Shaw outside the presence of the jury, plaintiffs counsel argued
for admission of her testimony. The trial judge excluded
the testimony and, on four separate occasions, he told
plaintiffs counsel if he did not like the ruling, he could
take it to the court of appeals.
At one point, plaintiffs counsel stated, "Your Honor,
if you will, at this point in time, you'll have to excuse my
lack of experience as a trial lawyer, but I don't know exacdy what to do. I understand what your ruling is going
to be here. I disagree with the ruling. This is a critical
witness for my case. I would ask for the right to [*18]
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file a motion with the Court of Appeals now, 'cause I
can't proceed further."
After reviewing the trial judge's comments on the
record during the voir dire, it is clear the trial judge exhibited frustration with plaintiffs counsel, but those
comments took place outside the presence of the jury,
and could not have prejudiced Corradi's right to a fair
trial.
Corradi also argues the trial judge erred when it sustained objections to plaintiffs counsel's questions during
direct examination on several occasions where defense
counsel had not posed an objection and the cumulative
effect of the trial judge's actions were prejudicial. In each
instance, the trial judge properly exercised his authority
to intervene in order to provide for the orderly and expeditious presentation of the evidence. See State v. Davis
(1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 450, 607 N.E.2d 543. Initially,
opposing counsel made an objection to Corradi's counsel
making comments rather than asking questions. Thereafter, in each instance the trial judge intervened to get Corradi's counsel to ask a question of the witnesses rather
than making a comment; the record does not reveal the
trial judge displayed^ any bias or hostility [*19] during
these objections. Accordingly, the cumulative effect of
the conduct of the trial judge in this case did not deny
Corradi a fair trial.
In her second and third assignments of error, Corradi
argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence which
denied her a fair trial. "A trial court is vested with broad
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in
any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the rules of procedure and evidence."
Rigby v. Lake Cty. (1991), 58 Ohio St. 3d 269, 271, 569
N.E.2d 1056. Appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the lower court abused its discretion. E.g.
Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.
3d 296, 299, 587 N.E.2d 290. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it
implies the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. E.g. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5
Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
Corradi argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence of "rumors" as hearsay. Corradi asserts the evidence of rumors was not hearsay within the meaning of
Evid.R. 801(C). In the alternative, Corradi asserts [*20]
the evidence of rumors constituted an admission by a
party-opponent within the meaning of Evid.R.
801(D)(2)(d), and therefore, was not hearsay. Corradi
also asserts the rumors were exceptions to the hearsay
rule under Evid.R. 803(1), (3), and (20).
"Hearsay" is an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Evid.R. 801(C).
Where an out-of-court statement is offered without refer-

ence to its truth, it is not hearsay. State v. Price (1992),
80 Ohio App. 3d 108, 608 N.E.2d 1088. "A statement is
not hearsay if it is admitted to prove that the declarant
made it, rather than to prove the truth of its contents."
State v. Williams (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 346, 528 N.E.2d
910. "Words constituting conduct are not hearsay, e.g.,
words of a contract, libel, slander, threats and the like."
Evid.R. 801(C), Staff Note.
In this case, Corradi presents the testimony of numerous witnesses to prove there were "rumors" circulating among the employees of EMMCO about the reasons
for her dismissal. This testimony was not used to prove
the truth of the contents of the statements, but simply to
demonstrate that the statements were made. Therefore,
the evidence of rumors [*21] was not hearsay within the
meaning of Evid.R. 801(C). Having found the evidence
of rumors not to be hearsay within the meaning of
Evid.R. 801(C), Corradi's alternative arguments under
Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d) and 803(1), (3), and (20) are moot.
Although the rumors in this case were not hearsay
and were admissible, the rumors were not attributed to
any of the defendants. Absent some evidence the rumors
were attributable to or caused by the defendants, they are
not actionable. See Turk and Cooper v. Foster, supra.
While it is clear certain rumors were circulated by Soltis,
it is not clear she was the source of the rumors Corradi
sought to introduce into evidence through the testimony
of EMMCO employees. Because Corradi failed to establish how the rumors related to the slanderous statements
made by Soltis, we find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding them as evidence.
Corradi also argues the trial court erred in the exclusion of the testimony about the nature of a conversation
she had with Sergeant William Schultz of the Bedford
Heights Police Department. Having reviewed the transcript and the manner in which these questions were
asked, it is clear Corradi was [*22] not attempting to
elicit hearsay testimony. However, Evi&R. 103(A)(2)
requires a party to proffer the substance of excluded evidence unless the substance of that evidence is apparent.
The failure to proffer that excluded evidence waives any
error. See State v. Brooks (1989), 44 Ohio St. 3d 185,
542 N.E.2d 636. In this case, Corradi failed to proffer the
substance of her conversation with Schultz and its relevance to this case is not apparent. Accordingly, any error
in excluding that testimony was waived.
Corradi also argues the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Regina Shaw as hearsay. Shaw
would have testified that she was prepared to hire Corradi for a job with Associated Estates Realty Company,
but decided not to hire Corradi on the basis of an unfavorable recommendation from EMMCO. While another
person contacted EMMCO for Shaw, Shaw's testimony
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was not offered for its truth. See Price, supra. Shaw's
testimony was offered to prove Corradi received an unfavorable recommendation from EMMCO and as such,
represented evidence of conduct which is not hearsay.
See Evid.R. 801(C). Accordingly, we find the trial judge
improperly excluded the testimony of Regina Shaw.
[*23]
Nonetheless, an unfavorable recommendation made
in good faith was a privileged communication. A communication by an employer as to the reasons for the discharge of a former employee to the former employee's
prospective employer is protected by a qualified privilege. Rinehart v. Maiorano (1991), 76 Ohio App. 3d 413,
421, 602 N.E.2d 340. "Only where the statements are
made maliciously is the privilege destroyed." Id. In this
case, Corradi did not present any evidence as to who
conveyed the unfavorable recommendation on behalf of
EMMCO, or as to its content or the substance of the recommendation. Absent some evidence that the communication was malicious, this court must presume it was
privileged. Although the trial court clearly erred in excluding the testimony of Rebecca Shaw, we find no
abuse of discretion because 4he communication was protected by a qualified privilege.
Corradi also argues the trial court erred by refusing
to permit her counsel to cross-examine witnesses identified with the defendant company EMMCO. Allowing or
refusing to allow leading questions in the examination of
a witness is subject to the control of the court, and absent
an abuse of discretion, the [*24] trial court's decision
should not be disturbed. Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 97, 111, 592
N.E.2d 828. Evid.R. 611(C) provides: "***When a party
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by
leading questions." Where a witness is identified with an
adverse party but is not hostile, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court refuse to allow the use of leading questions. See Ramage, supra.
In the case, counsel for Corradi called several employees of EMMCO on direct examination, but the trial
did not permit him to ask them leading questions. To the
extent that they were employed by the defendant company, EMMCO, they were identified with an adverse
party within the meaning of Evid.R. 611(C). Nonetheless, there was no evidence during direct examination
that they exhibited hostility toward Corradi. Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In her fifth assignment of error, Corradi argues the
trial erred by refusing to permit her to amend her complaint. Civ.R 15(B) provides: "When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
[*25] of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects

as if they had been raised in the pleadings.***" "Under
Civ.R. 15(B), implied consent is not established merely
because evidence bearing directly on an impleaded issue
was introduced without objection; it must appear that the
parties understood the evidence was aimed at the impleaded issue. " State, ex rel Evans, v. Bainbridge Twp.
Trustees (1983), 5 Ohio St. 3d 41, 448 N.E.2d 1159 at
paragraph two of the syllabus. "Whether an impleaded
issue is tried by implied consent is to be determined by
the trial court, whose finding will not be disturbed, absent showing of an abuse of discretion." Id. at paragraph
three of the syllabus.
In this case, counsel for Corradi moved to amend the
complaint to include the torts of invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress immediately
prior to resting the plaintiffs case. The trial judge denied
the motion. A careful review of the record does not reveal any discussion or testimony during the trial that
would suggest the parties understood the evidence to be
aimed at the unpleaded issues of invasion of privacy or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly,
[*26] the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Corradi's motion to amend the pleadings under
Civ.R. 15(B).
In her sixth assignment of error, Corradi argues the
trial court erred in its instructions to the jury by misstating the elements of defamation and by refusing to instruct the jury on slander per se. Requested jury instructions should be given if they are correct statements of the
law applicable to the facts in the case and reasonable
minds might reach the conclusion sought by the instruction. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.
3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d 828. "In reviewing a record to
ascertain the presence of sufficient evidence to support
the giving of an instruction, an appellate court should
determine whether the record contains evidence from
which reasonable minds might reach the conclusion
sought by the instruction." Id., quoting Feterle v. Huettner (1971), 28 Ohio St 2d 54, 275 N.E.2d 340 at the
syllabus.
The question of whether a statement is slander per se
is an issue of law for the trial court to decide. Matalka v.
Lagemann (1985), 21 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136, 486
N.E.2d 1220. "Slander per se means that the slander is
accomplished [*27] by the very words spoken. w
McCartney v. Oblates of St. Francis deSales (1992), 80
Ohio App. 3d 345, 353, 609 N.E.2d 216. "In order for an
oral defamatory remark to be considered slander per se it
must consist of words which import an indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment, imputes some loathsome or contagious disease
which excludes one from society or tends to injure one in
his trade or occupation." Id.
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In this case, Soltis told two people that Corradi was
discharged for taking money from the petty cash fund,
and told another person that Corradi was discharged for
removing carpeting and appliances from the apartments
she managed. In both instances, Soltis suggested Corradi
had committed theft offenses which were indictable offenses involving moral1 turpitude, and tended to injure
reputation in her occupation. Thus, as a matter of law,
the statements allegedly made by Soltis were slander per
se, and the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on slander per se. Accordingly, this case is reversed and
remanded for a new trial against Irene Soltis.
Corradi also argues the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the [*28] issue of nominal damages.
In an action for slander per se compensatory damages
will be presumed. King v. Bogner (1993), 88 Ohio App.
3d 564, 567, 624 N.E.2d 364. Because this action involves slander per se and damages are presumed, the
question of whether Corradi was entitled to a jury instruction on nominal damages is moot.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
This cause is affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the
costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for
this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
PORTER, J., and
McMONAGLE, J. CONCUR.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON
PRESIDING JUDGE
N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of
Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is
an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10)
days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped
to indicate journalization, at which time it [*29] will
become the judgment and order of the Court and time
period for review will begin to run.

